1
Introduction
The political direction, organization and arming of the Salvadoran insurgency is coordinated and heavily
influenced by Cuba with the active support of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Vietnam and other
Communist states… the insurgency in El Salvador has been progressively transformed into a text-book
case of indirect armed aggression by Communist powers through Cuba.
-State Department “Whitepaper” on El Salvador, February 19
th
1981
I must speak to you tonight about a mounting danger in Central America that threatens the security of the
United States. This danger will not go away; it will grow worse, much worse, if we fail to take action now.
I'm speaking of Nicaragua, a Soviet ally on the American mainland only 2 hours flying time from our own
borders. With over a billion dollars in Soviet-bloc aid, the Communist government of Nicaragua has
launched a campaign to subvert and topple its democratic neighbors.
–Ronald Reagan, Speech before Joint Session of Congress, March 16
th
1986
International relations (IR) scholars have long debated the role of public opinion
in U.S. foreign policy. Among the most intriguing questions that they have sought to
answer is when will the American public support a policy that entails the use of force
abroad and under what conditions will it oppose such a policy. Scholars have identified
several eras in which patterns of public opinion are found to be either generally
supportive (Cold War Consensus) or opposed (Post-Vietnam era) to military
engagements. Further, authors have identified multiple independent variables ranging
from interests, elite cues, to cost-aversion as explanations for when the public will
support or oppose a foreign policy that requires military force. More recently, Bruce
Jentleson (1992; 1998) has identified the 1980s and 1990s as being characterized by a
"Post Post-Vietnam" pattern of public opinion. During this time period he finds that
support or opposition for the use of force abroad depends on whether its objective is to
foment internal political change (IPC) in another state or to instill foreign policy restraint
(FPR) on an aggressive power threatening the U.S. or its allies. Since the publication of
his articles, Jentleson’s theory has become a leading explanation of when public opinion
supports or opposes the use of force abroad in international relations.
However, I contend that Jentleson’s Principal Policy Objective (PPO) explanation
Convention