2
is problematic for several theoretical and methodological reasons, which I elaborate more
fully below. In this article, I revisit two of Jentleson’s original cases, U.S. relations with
El Salvador and Nicaragua during the 1980s to illustrate PPO theory’s shortcomings and
to test an alternative theory. As the epigraphs highlight, the Reagan Administration
portrayed its policy towards Central America as if it were designed principally for what
Jentleson (1992) calls Foreign Policy Restraint (FPR). In other words, that its policy was
designed “to affect the external behavior of another state that aggressively threatens the
United States, its citizens, or its allies” (Jentleson, 1992: 53). For the duration of his
Presidency, Ronald Reagan tried to convince the American public that the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN) government in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels in El Salvador were the spearhead in a global
communist conspiracy that posed a direct threat to the United States’ national security.
Both the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan revolutionary movements were portrayed as actively
threatening the U.S., not because they would take over their countries per se, but rather
because once they had taken over their respective countries, a domino effect would ensue
toppling the rest of Central America, Mexico and eventually the United States itself. The
FSLN’s financial, political, and military support of the FMLN’s efforts to overthrow the
Salvadoran government was thus argued to be the first step in the destabilization of the
Western Hemisphere. According to the Reagan administration U.S. policy towards
Central America was designed to stop this aggression.
Jentleson (1991: 66) acknowledges this stating, “Officially, the original rationale
for supporting the Contras was to impose foreign policy restraint on the Sandinistas in the
interest of regional security: to interdict arms supplies to the leftist guerrillas in El
Convention