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American public is more disposed to support restraining (FPR) rather than remaking
(IPC) foreign governments. First, the public differentiates between interstate and
intrastate domains based on the concept of sovereignty that underlies international law.
Secondly, restraining an aggressive foreign adversary through military means is easier
than successfully accomplishing regime change, which involves winning the hearts and
minds of the populace. Third, FPR has a much higher degree of international legitimacy
than a policy of IPC. Finally, Jentleson argues that the use of force for FPR also has more
domestic political legitimacy than the use of force for internal political change.
While Jentleson’s argument is compelling, there are several factors making it
problematic. Theoretically, his four factors listed above provide a weak foundation for
the strong distinction he draws between support and opposition for FPR and IPC
interventions. I list the problems with each of the contentions made above in
corresponding order. First, the mass public is generally ignorant of foreign policy issues.
Thus, assuming that the public would be able to differentiate between interstate and
intrastate conflicts is problematic. In fact, the empirical evidence tends to contradict this
assumption. Second, even if military intervention for foreign policy restraint is easier
than intervening for internal political change it is not clear that the public will perceive it
as such or even know which objective is being pursued. Third, while policies that pursue
foreign policy restraint may have greater legitimacy internationally that does not mean
that they will necessarily have greater support domestically. Fourth, even if we grant that
the use of force for foreign policy restraint has greater domestic legitimacy than a policy
designed to cause or prevent internal political change, this is a public attitude or
preference. Whether that attitude gets translated into public opinion support or opposition
Convention