19
19
wish and whim of the United States government. Thus when an ally such as London
stands so fiercely, staunchly in support of the United States when others—including
French and German NATO partners—stand in such profound opposition, one still needs
to stand up and take notice and ask why.
To be sure, the overtures that each made to the other early on was no great
political surprise. It was, in fact, a given. As Warren Hoge wrote, “In hugging
Washington warmly, Mr. Blair is doing what almost all postwar prime ministers have
done.”
43
The difference here is that the president in Washington is a leader who has not
garnered the respect—and, indeed, has garnered much contempt—in Britain, particularly
for his stance toward Iraq. Blair waxes philosophical about the friendship, but with an
eye toward the political reality of his position. Hoge quotes him as telling a group of
American reporters that “I always say to people that the thing I fear is not American
unilateralism. It is actually American isolationism were it ever to go down that path.”
44
Regardless, the aforementioned question of why is especially compelling given the lack
of support that Blair has at home for his decision. If we look at this through the lens of
Snyder, it makes considerable sense, for Britain’s partner—the United States—was in
need of aid, and Britain supplied it in terms of not only moral support but considerable
troop support in the war itself. Even if this wasn’t in Britain’s interest—though Blair
would obviously contend that it was—by virtue of being partnered with the United States,
Britain opens itself up to the five reasons that Snyder listed that keeps alliance promises
kept. Moreover, this may suggest alliance dependence at play. The implicit or explicit
threat of allies’ deserting the partnership or otherwise letting down the other member(s)
43
Quoted in Dan Froomkin, “Bush and Blair: The Odd Couple,” www.washingtonpost.com, November 12,
2004.
Convention