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Leadership and Foreign Policy Change: The Enigma of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon

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Abstract:

LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: THE ENIGMA OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ARIEL SHARON Based on primary research conducted in Israel in the summer of 2004, the personality and ideological factors influencing Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's capacity for change and concessions toward the Palestinians will be analyzed. I ground my analysis in an explicit political psychological formulation and explore the generality of that formulation. Based on the ideological barriers to accommodation with the Palestinians inherent in Likud ideology, it is likely that a change in the coalition government will be required in order to reach a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. However, Sharon is no ideologue and is more likely to compromise than was Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir. Unlike Shamir, Sharon was actually a nominal member of the Labor party in his youth, as were his parents. Not having grown up steeped in Revisionist ideology, he does not rigidly toe the line and has publicly accepted the idea of a Palestinian state. He has proposed unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip, while most members of his Likud Party voted against withdrawal in a recent referendum. Although attached to the West Bank settlements that he helped develop and expand, Sharon has indicated that he will dismantle some. However, true to the Revisionist roots of his ideology, Sharon believes that time is on Israel's side, that the Arabs' relative military strength will diminish, and that peacemaking can be put off for another 20 years while Israel builds other settlements and increases immigration. Sharon also shares the Revisionist belief that Israel's enemies can be walled off to ensure security. Nevertheless, greater pressure on him will lead to more tactical compromise, and to his replacement when these compromises prove to be insufficient. Most of the literature on international conflict and its resolution ignores the impact of political leaders on war and peace. In effect such scholars take a rational choice approach, positing that all leaders will react in the same manner to common environmental stimuli. Moreover, those scholars who are attentive to leaders tend to assume that leaders have stable political predispositions that make them resistant to change. From this it would follow that a change of leadership is necessary for a nation to shift from a hard-line to a strategy of peace making. This paper contrasts with the formulation that leaders have to be replaced for enduring rivalries to be resolved in that it argues that some leaders undergo changes, and above all develops a theory about why and how such changes come about. I go beyond arguing that, in general, leaders matter, by analyzing more specifically what it is about their belief systems and personalities that can ultimately make a difference to their country's foreign policy, especially toward a long standing enemy. I find that, while probably no hardliner can stand completely still in the face of important changes, only hardliners who adhere to ideologies which have specific components that act as obstacles to change, and who have an orientation toward the past, may need to be replaced for dramatic policy changes to take place. Although a change in the opponent and in the environment may be necessary for a leader to change his image of an enemy, a combination of three additional elements act as sufficient causes: 1) either a weak link to an ideology or adherence to an ideology which does not have the components I articulate as obstacles 2) a present or future individual time orientation 3) either a flexible cognitive system or exposure to a significant advisor with different views of the opponent. The factors that are included in ideologies that decrease the chances for changes in the enemy image are: specific ideological goals that contradict those of the enemy; a long, optimistic time horizon that prevents adherents from believing that peace is urgent or from perceiving policy failure; a perception that the world is hostile; and a view that security is possible without peace.
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Aronoff, Yael. "Leadership and Foreign Policy Change: The Enigma of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69873_index.html>

APA Citation:

Aronoff, Y. S. , 2005-03-05 "Leadership and Foreign Policy Change: The Enigma of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69873_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: THE ENIGMA OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ARIEL SHARON Based on primary research conducted in Israel in the summer of 2004, the personality and ideological factors influencing Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's capacity for change and concessions toward the Palestinians will be analyzed. I ground my analysis in an explicit political psychological formulation and explore the generality of that formulation. Based on the ideological barriers to accommodation with the Palestinians inherent in Likud ideology, it is likely that a change in the coalition government will be required in order to reach a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. However, Sharon is no ideologue and is more likely to compromise than was Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir. Unlike Shamir, Sharon was actually a nominal member of the Labor party in his youth, as were his parents. Not having grown up steeped in Revisionist ideology, he does not rigidly toe the line and has publicly accepted the idea of a Palestinian state. He has proposed unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip, while most members of his Likud Party voted against withdrawal in a recent referendum. Although attached to the West Bank settlements that he helped develop and expand, Sharon has indicated that he will dismantle some. However, true to the Revisionist roots of his ideology, Sharon believes that time is on Israel's side, that the Arabs' relative military strength will diminish, and that peacemaking can be put off for another 20 years while Israel builds other settlements and increases immigration. Sharon also shares the Revisionist belief that Israel's enemies can be walled off to ensure security. Nevertheless, greater pressure on him will lead to more tactical compromise, and to his replacement when these compromises prove to be insufficient. Most of the literature on international conflict and its resolution ignores the impact of political leaders on war and peace. In effect such scholars take a rational choice approach, positing that all leaders will react in the same manner to common environmental stimuli. Moreover, those scholars who are attentive to leaders tend to assume that leaders have stable political predispositions that make them resistant to change. From this it would follow that a change of leadership is necessary for a nation to shift from a hard-line to a strategy of peace making. This paper contrasts with the formulation that leaders have to be replaced for enduring rivalries to be resolved in that it argues that some leaders undergo changes, and above all develops a theory about why and how such changes come about. I go beyond arguing that, in general, leaders matter, by analyzing more specifically what it is about their belief systems and personalities that can ultimately make a difference to their country's foreign policy, especially toward a long standing enemy. I find that, while probably no hardliner can stand completely still in the face of important changes, only hardliners who adhere to ideologies which have specific components that act as obstacles to change, and who have an orientation toward the past, may need to be replaced for dramatic policy changes to take place. Although a change in the opponent and in the environment may be necessary for a leader to change his image of an enemy, a combination of three additional elements act as sufficient causes: 1) either a weak link to an ideology or adherence to an ideology which does not have the components I articulate as obstacles 2) a present or future individual time orientation 3) either a flexible cognitive system or exposure to a significant advisor with different views of the opponent. The factors that are included in ideologies that decrease the chances for changes in the enemy image are: specific ideological goals that contradict those of the enemy; a long, optimistic time horizon that prevents adherents from believing that peace is urgent or from perceiving policy failure; a perception that the world is hostile; and a view that security is possible without peace.

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