styles has key strengths and weaknesses: leaders fitting these divergent profiles are prone
to different kinds of errors, and may be better suited for dealing with different types of
international situations.
The findings that were contrary to our hypotheses (involving need for power,
conceptual complexity, belief in ability to control events, task emphasis, and self-
confidence) should not be minimized. The theoretical expectations articulated above
regarding each of these characteristics’ effects on leaders’ responsiveness to norms are
based on a great deal of theory and research, and should not be rejected based on this one
study. The present project focuses on only seven leaders, in the context of a single
instance of norm adherence/violation. More cases, involving many more decision-
makers, must be examined before the conclusions of this study can be viewed as
definitive. One potential explanation for John Kerry’s surprisingly high scores on certain
characteristics such as need for power is that his position as a presidential challenger
during the height of an election campaign served as an important environmental influence
that artificially inflated these scores. The need to continually challenge Bush, to establish
his own identity as a can-do leader, and to emphasize his credentials as a war hero to
counteract the critique of “soft on defense” may have made Kerry’s “environment” or
“audience” somewhat less comparable to those of the other officials examined. (Recall
that most of the interviews available for Kerry were in 2003 and 2004). Similarly, the
face validity of some of George W. Bush’s scores—particularly in relation to other
Anglo-American leaders—appears somewhat questionable and at odds with more
impressionistic accounts of his leadership style. An analysis that included more variation
in audiences, subjects, and perhaps prepared vs. spontaneous remarks would allow these
Convention