whether and how these potential constraints will be expressed in policy behavior (Keller,
2005a). That is, a (minimally) permissive situation
1
is a necessary but insufficient
condition for norm violation. The additional element that must be present is decision-
maker(s) who are willing to take advantage of this opportunity to violate the norm; some
leaders will adhere to norms even if they are ambiguous and there is enough “wiggle
room” to justify violation. Hence, while Shannon (2000) suggests that the ability to
justify norm violation “depends on the norm and the situation,” we add a third variable—
leadership style—to his framework in an effort to further extend the model’s analytic
leverage and to help account for additional unexplained variation in states’ responses to
norms. Importantly, rather than assuming that either leaders’ characteristics or the
nature of the structural environment alone determines outcomes, we posit that the
interaction between decision-makers’ needs/desires and the constraints/opportunities
inherent in a given situation determines behavior.
Furthermore, we place less emphasis on the presence of ambiguous norms or
situations as a prerequisite for norm violation—a notion central to Shannon’s original
formulation. Shannon (2000) notes that:
leaders who value their standing in international society seek to avoid negative
social judgments and are likely to violate the norm only if there is room for
interpretation of the norm or the situation…some situations are not credible
instances that justify the abandonment of the norm. In such cases, one is not
likely to violate due to the political and psychological costs of engaging in
untoward behavior.
1
The “permissiveness” of the environment for norm violation is a function not only (and perhaps not even
primarily) of the ambiguity of the norm—the ability of an actor to minimize certain military or diplomatic
costs of norm violation—through superior capabilities, for instance—is a key aspect of situational
opportunity.
Convention