18
On the one hand, isolationism in the 1990s had shed much of its negative connotation,
and Congress itself was divided how best to pursue foreign policy, which had ceased to be a high
priority in any case. (Nordlinger 1995: 25; Sloan 1995: 217; Senate hrg. 1998: 55) Many
Americans believed that the U.S. should reduce its global security burdens and saw no real
reason to maintain a presence in Europe, much less seek an expanded alliance. (Carpenter 2001:
33, 35) As such, the view was that policymakers should avoid binding commitments and not
waste scarce resources on problems in peripheral regions, such as the former Yugoslavia. (34,
37; Sloan 1995: 225) In addition, some committed internationalists joined neo-isolationists in
opposing expansion, fearing the creation of new dividing lines in Europe, the alienation of
Russia, and the diversion of funds away from the Pentagon. (Carpenter 2001; Rosner 1996) From
this perspective, expanding and transforming NATO would simply be an unnecessary mistake.
(Carpenter 2001; Sloan 1995: 218, 221) On the other hand, “the US consensus to continue to
pursue security for the European continent through NATO was strikingly strong.” (Mattox 2001:
17) Supporters of expansion sought to avoid a “power vacuum” in the former Eastern bloc and
believed that U.S. interests would be best served by promoting and protecting the advance of
democracy there, via the established institutions and values of NATO. (Sloan 1995: 222) Yet
while Americans generally supported NATO and the values it represents, they were considerably
less willing to support the more concrete commitment of their money and lives to its
internationalist endeavors. (Dorff 1998: 22-23; Schlesinger 1995b: 7; Sloan 1995: 221, 225;
Senate hrg. 1998: 55)
The specific issue of NATO enlargement, however, was treated for the most part with
“benign apathy and acceptance” by both Congress and the public. (Kaplan 2001: 259-260;
Mattox 2001: 23) The atmosphere in Congress toward foreign policy after the Cold War was
Convention