2
periphery. On the other hand, this revolution in foreign affairs was made politically palatable not
only by the presence of emerging threats, but also as a natural extension of the foreign policy
trajectory begun after Pearl Harbor and World War II: specifically, membership in the United
Nations, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, the Vandenberg
Resolution, and later by the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the existence of NATO itself.
Finally, I will end with some projections for the post-Iraq alliance, in which a possible new
trajectory of unilateralism is emerging, though not without considerable controversy.
A T
RADITION OF
I
SOLATIONISM
Although not in a commercial or cultural sense, American political isolationism predates
independence and stems from a desire to avoid debilitating involvement in Europe’s eternal
problems and rivalries. (Adler 1957: 10; Schlesinger 1995a 577; Schlesinger 1995b: 2; Solomon
1999: 421) A “corollary of the independence movement itself,” isolation was an expression of
“the spirit of independence and separation from Europe which animated the Revolution,”
allowing freedom of action and distance from great power conflicts on the Continent. (Dulles
1955: 2, 3; Appleton 1968: 55) Most famously articulated in George Washington’s 1796
Farewell Address, a firm policy against permanent alliances provided the United States with the
opportunity to mature in peace and prosperity, made possible by advantageous geography. Such
measures, it was thought, were necessary to protect the new country against the distant feuds of
the Old World and maintain its hard-won independence. These sentiments were reiterated in
Thomas Jefferson’s 1801 inaugural address, which spoke for “peace, commerce, and honest
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.” (Jefferson 1801: 4) Isolationism was,
in short, a measure to ensure the welfare of the United States. (Washington 1796: 175; Ruggie
1998: 203; Kaplan 1984: 1, 15; Nordlinger 1995: 215)
Convention