19
among M, F, U, and 0.
41
To characterize any of these three models give us an insight of the formation of the
U.S.-Japan alliance, Snidal’s interpretation of Waltz’s argument provides some lead: “When
Waltz argues that sates do not cooperate when others will gain more than them and
threaten their security, he is implicitly describing a trade-off between short-term absolute
gains (i.e., immediate payoffs from cooperation) and long-term absolute gains (i.e., security
over the long haul.)”
42
In this sense, Washington must have valued long term absolute gains from the alliance, a
preference especially evidenced after the so called reverse course diplomacy – the change
from a punitive to a generous tone. Further, the inability of Washington to free ride
implies that F is negligible for the U.S. Therefore, the payoff to U is smaller than M, and r
is close to 0 rather than 1. Conversely, for Japan, the value of F is positive and larger than
M, U is lower, but again the discount factor r is close to zero. This payoff structure
represents the different preference orderings of the two nations. Thus, the United States
and Japan were not playing the same game from the outset. Given the difference of each
side’s preference, Snidal’s six representative cooperation problems do not validly apply to
the negotiations between Washington and Tokyo.
IV.
The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Fate of Koizumi Diplomacy
Since Prime Minister Koizumi contends that maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance is
41
. Ibid., 707.
42
. Ibid., 704.
Convention