9
provides several examples of particular strategic interests. One of these is the American
interest in Israel after 1945. With regard to the U.S. interest in West Europe during the
cold war, he contends that it has both strategic and intrinsic content.
Snyder did not expressly discuss the U.S.-Japan alliance, but his methods clearly extend
to the present issue. Coincident with the gap of values already discussed, a gap of general
and particular strategic interests between Washington and Tokyo might have also
contributed to the halo of the alliance. For the United States, a sweeping fear of
Communism and the rise of the Soviet Union as a hegemon, clearly general strategic
interests, provided the impetus to conclude the peace and accompanying security treaties.
John J. Mearsheimer’s statement relays this focus, “the central aim of American foreign
policy has traditionally been to dominate the western hemisphere while not permitting
another great power to dominate Europe and Northeast Asia. The United States has not
wanted a peer competitor.”
24
Pursuit of general strategic interests killed two birds with one
stone; the U.S. showed a formidable stance against the Soviet Union, and all-the-while,
controlling or containing Japan, the previous enemy. On the other hand, Japan first
prioritized particular intrinsic interests, and latter particular strategic interests were
added by the United States during the course of negotiation. Japan wanted to gain
independence, recover its economy, and reenter international economy.
In bipolar systems, the power structure itself largely determines the strategic interests of
the superpowers. Under the prevailing circumstances, the United States bore no
contradiction between its general and particular interests, as resolution of general interests
24
. John J. Mearsheimer, “The Future of American Pacifier,”
Foreign Affairs
80, no. 5(2001):
46.
Convention