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Kosovo 1999: Clinton, Coercive Diplomacy, and the War to End All (Ground) Wars
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© 2005, Sébastien Barthe & Charles-Philippe David – Do not quote without prior authorization
1
Kosovo 1999: Clinton, Coercive Diplomacy, and the War to End All
(Ground) Wars
1
Draft. DO NOT QUOTE without prior authorization from the authors
Charles-Philippe David & Sébastien Barthe
2
Center for United States Studies
Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies
University of Québec at Montréal
david.## email not listed ##
barthe.## email not listed ##
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of analogical thinking insteering the Clinton administration toward a strategy of coercive diplomacy inresponse to the emerging crisis in Kosovo in 1998. It is our thesis that throughoutthe decision-making process, key administration figures used a variety ofanalogies to frame the situation, and these prompted them to advocateconflicting policy options. Specifically, while “activists” like Madeleine Albrightand Wesley Clark pushed for a full military option to complement diplomaticefforts, evoking the “lessons” of Bosnia as justification, “minimalists” likeWilliam Cohen and Sandy Berger invoked images of Vietnam and Somalia tokeep U.S. involvement to a minimum. It would appear that, ultimately, theBosnia analogy prevailed, leading the Clinton administration to launch a militarycampaign limited to high-altitude strategic bombing, as has been done in 1995.Building on previous studies of American decision-making and military actionsin the Kosovo war of 1999,
3
we will expand on the idea that the administration’s
1
This paper is presented at the International Studies Association Conference in Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA, March 1-5, 2005. It is a follow-up to “’Foreign Policy Is Not What I Came Here toDo’ -- Dissecting Clinton’s Foreign Policy: A First Cut,” presented at the joint CEE/ISAConference in Budapest, June 2003, and at the IPSA Convention in Durban, June-July 2003, and“Foreign Policy-Making in the Clinton Administration: Reassessing Bosnia and the “TurningPoint” of 1995,” presented at the International Studies Association Conference in Montréal,Canada, March 17-20, 2004. The papers are part of a three-year research program on the evolutionof foreign policy-making under the Clinton Administration, funded by the Social Sciences andHumanities Research Council of Canada.
2
Charles-Philippe David is Raoul Dandurand Professor of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies and
Director of the Center for United States Studies at the University of Québec at Montréal.Sébastien Barthe is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of Québec at Montréaland a junior research fellow at the Center. The authors wish to thank all the staff at the RaoulDandurand Chair for their helpful comments on previous versions of this text.
3
These include Eric Moskowitz and Jeffrey S. Lantis, “The War in Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy,”
in Ralph G. Carter, ed., Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy: From Terrorism to Trade,Washington, DC, CQ Press, 2002, pp. 59-87 (this chapter was re-published under the title“Conflict in the Balkans” in Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, edited by Karl F.Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 253-267; inthis paper, we refer to the 2002 edition); Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Unlearning
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| | Authors: Barthe, Sebastien. and David, Charles-Philippe. |
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© 2005, Sébastien Barthe & Charles-Philippe David – Do not quote without prior authorization
1
Kosovo 1999: Clinton, Coercive Diplomacy, and the War to End All
(Ground) Wars
1
Draft. DO NOT QUOTE without prior authorization from the authors
Charles-Philippe David & Sébastien Barthe
2
Center for United States Studies
Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies
University of Québec at Montréal
david.## email not listed ##
barthe.## email not listed ##
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of analogical thinking in
steering the Clinton administration toward a strategy of coercive diplomacy in
response to the emerging crisis in Kosovo in 1998. It is our thesis that throughout
the decision-making process, key administration figures used a variety of
analogies to frame the situation, and these prompted them to advocate
conflicting policy options. Specifically, while “activists” like Madeleine Albright
and Wesley Clark pushed for a full military option to complement diplomatic
efforts, evoking the “lessons” of Bosnia as justification, “minimalists” like
William Cohen and Sandy Berger invoked images of Vietnam and Somalia to
keep U.S. involvement to a minimum. It would appear that, ultimately, the
Bosnia analogy prevailed, leading the Clinton administration to launch a military
campaign limited to high-altitude strategic bombing, as has been done in 1995.
Building on previous studies of American decision-making and military actions
in the Kosovo war of 1999,
3
we will expand on the idea that the administration’s
1
This paper is presented at the International Studies Association Conference in Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA, March 1-5, 2005. It is a follow-up to “’Foreign Policy Is Not What I Came Here to
Do’ -- Dissecting Clinton’s Foreign Policy: A First Cut,” presented at the joint CEE/ISA
Conference in Budapest, June 2003, and at the IPSA Convention in Durban, June-July 2003, and
“Foreign Policy-Making in the Clinton Administration: Reassessing Bosnia and the “Turning
Point” of 1995,” presented at the International Studies Association Conference in Montréal,
Canada, March 17-20, 2004. The papers are part of a three-year research program on the evolution
of foreign policy-making under the Clinton Administration, funded by the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada.
2
Charles-Philippe David is Raoul Dandurand Professor of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies and
Director of the Center for United States Studies at the University of Québec at Montréal.
Sébastien Barthe is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the University of Québec at Montréal
and a junior research fellow at the Center. The authors wish to thank all the staff at the Raoul
Dandurand Chair for their helpful comments on previous versions of this text.
3
These include Eric Moskowitz and Jeffrey S. Lantis, “The War in Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy,”
in Ralph G. Carter, ed., Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy: From Terrorism to Trade,
Washington, DC, CQ Press, 2002, pp. 59-87 (this chapter was re-published under the title
“Conflict in the Balkans” in Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, edited by Karl F.
Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 253-267; in
this paper, we refer to the 2002 edition); Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Unlearning
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