© 2005, Sébastien Barthe & Charles-Philippe David – Do not quote without prior authorization
9
mental scheme shared by most of the Principals that did not depend solely on
that analogy.
Thus, the situation in Kosovo was defined as a repeat of unwarranted Serbian
aggression against an unarmed (Muslim) population. The stakes were high:
ethnic cleansing was considered a crime against humanity by the perceivers.
Furthermore, it was likely to spark a flow of refugees that would destabilize an
embattled region of the world, one in which, incidentally, American troops were
already deployed. “Knowing” Milosevic, a strategy of coercive diplomacy had to
be implemented without delay: if left unchecked, the Yugoslav President would
not curb his abuses. The Bosnia analogy also led to the conclusion that if force
were in fact used against Milosevic, he would yield. In 1995, it took only two
weeks before he decided to accept the American-led peace plan. Table 1
summarizes the policy options suggested by the analogy with Bosnia.
Table 1: Implications of the Bosnia analogy for policy options in Kosovo
Diagnostic task
Result
Define the nature of the situation
Serbian paramilitary aggression against ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo is akin to Bosnian Serb
aggression against Bosnian Muslims from 1992
to 1995
Assess the stakes
Risk of humanitarian catastrophe if Milosevic
is not firmly opposed
Provide prescriptions
Coercive diplomacy should be the preferred
strategy: the U.S. should threaten to use force
to compel Milosevic to stop the aggression in
Kosovo and force him to negotiate a settlement
with the Kosovar civilian leadership
Predict the chances of success
In 1995, Milosevic yielded after 12 days of
bombardment
Evaluate moral rightness
Not addressed directly
Warn about dangers associated with the
options
Doing nothing lets Milosevic get away with
ethnic cleansing. Pursuing coercive diplomacy
worked in 1995: Milosevic quickly ended his
involvement in Bosnia and agreed to the
Dayton Peace Accords
Convention