1
Introduction
“You’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe.”
-- Donald Rumsfeld, January 2003
The comment by the United States Secretary of Defense could simply have been
intended to illustrate the changed geographical and political map of Europe since the end
of the Cold War. Europe had, prior to 1991 and in the context of American foreign
policy, explicitly meant the western portion of Europe that encompassed NATO and the
broader transatlantic relationship that emerged after World War II. In many ways,
Rumsfeld was accurate in decrying a narrow vision of what constituted Europe in 2003.
Europe was no longer merely the land on the western side of the now defunct Iron
Curtain and encompassing the NATO of 1991. The support (often small or limited, but
governmental support nonetheless) for American military intervention from Poland,
Hungary, Ukraine, Denmark, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and other members of the
“coalition of the willing” did illustrate Rumsfeld’s point that the lack of support of
France, Germany, Belgium, and other traditional Western European allies did not reflect
a unified or entirely accurate reflection of the European response to US foreign policy
developments in Iraq.
However, the comment was not merely a critique of an anachronistic geographical
lexicon, it was an explicit criticism of the foreign policies and politics of Western
European states, governments, and peoples that opposed US-led military efforts in the
Iraqi crisis. This criticism suggested that Western Europe was unable or unwilling to face
the consequences and challenges of the post-Cold War, post-September 11, and war on
terrorism world. The criticism was that Europe lacked the military, technology,
willingness, and credibility to act when events deem then necessary. The criticism was
Convention