1
The real distinction is between those who adapt their purposes to reality and those who
seek to mold reality in the light of their purposes.
-Henry A. Kissinger
U.S. foreign policy, from the end of the Cold War in 1991 until the dark day of
September 11
th
, can be remembered as a period of squandered opportunities by the
United States. “From the fall of the Berlin Wall until September 11, 2001, the United
States had no grand strategy, no design to guide the ship of state.”
1
The assumptions
made by both the Bush and Clinton administration were that in this unipolar environment,
the United States did not expend excess energy to negotiate with other great powers,
since it was presumed that no major power disruptions could threaten the international
system. In 1992, a Pentagon document was leaked which detailed a U.S. foreign policy
that sought to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. To avoid a re-emergence, the
United States “must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order
that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a
greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.”
2
However, it soon became evident that the United States was ill-prepared to fulfill this
obligation.
The terrorist attacks on the morning of September 11, 2001 shook the
presumption most Americans had about U.S. superiority and safety. The idea that the
United States, despite its military and economic prowess, could be besieged on its own
land, by its own planes, and completely caught off guard by 19 determined terrorists,
beckoned policymakers to ask what constitutes national security threat in the
1
Charles Kupchan. The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-
First Century. p. 12.
2
“Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival” New York Times, March 8,
1992.
Convention