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Echoes of Vietnam?: Body Counts and Public Perceptions of Success and Failure in the War in Iraq
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2004, while only thirty-nine percent voted for Kerry. Finally, seven percent of our samplehad some sort of past, current, or future (planned) service in the military.
Data Analysis
The effects of exposure to casualties are complicated (see Tables 1-15).
Participants in the experiment offered almost random guesses about actual US militarydeaths, and their guesses about deaths were consistently unrelated to their opinions aboutIraq. Only once did estimates of deaths in Iraq produce a meaningful difference inopinions about what to do in Iraq. Clearly, if Americans don’t know what reality lookslike in Iraq (deaths), this calls into question the cumulative casualty hypothesis.
On the other hand, participants’ tolerance for hypothetical casualties was consistentlyrelated to their opinions about Iraq. Those with higher tolerance were more favorable intheir assessments and were more likely to prefer to “stick it out” in Iraq.
Political variables, like whether the participant had voted for Bush in 2004 were alsostrongly related to opinions abut Iraq.
Our claim about the complexity of casualty data stems from the inconsistent main effectswe find for our experimental manipulations. Sometimes the stories about American deaddirectly influence opinions, but their effects are also often moderated by voting for Bushand/or acceptance for hypothetical casualties. Likewise, the body count stories movedpeople consistently in a “pro-war” direction, but this effect was not always statisticallysignificant. The effect of exposure to the body count frame was also mediated by theacceptance of hypothetical casualties and voting for Bush. What you think about Iraqafter exposure to different ways of presenting casualties usually depends on your priorconvictions.
Conclusion
The impact of casualty sensitivity on public support for U.S. military
intervention/occupation is complex and subtle, as are the determinants of casualtysensitivity. This area of research has moved far beyond univariate, monotonic, andcumulative observations about the relationship between increasing casualties anddecreasing public support over time in the Vietnam and Korea cases. Our results supportthe work of Gartner, Larson, Feaver and Gelpi and others, by demonstrating that eliteframing and counter framing, hypothetical estimates of acceptable/unacceptablecasualties, understanding of the objectives of the war, previous perceptions ofsuccess/failure, partisan and ideological differences, and demographic factors all appearto affect the public response to information about U.S. casualties. We build on thisprevious work by revealing the differences between the impact of body-count andcasualty-ratio frames and by focusing on marginal casualties in an embeddedexperimental survey. While we cannot make grand claims about the generalizability ofour results, given our reliance on student participants; we can modestly suggest that ourresearch sheds light on a previously unexplored area.
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| | Authors: Boettcher III, William. and Cobb, Michael. |
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2004, while only thirty-nine percent voted for Kerry. Finally, seven percent of our sample
had some sort of past, current, or future (planned) service in the military.
Data Analysis
The effects of exposure to casualties are complicated (see Tables 1-15).
Participants in the experiment offered almost random guesses about actual US military
deaths, and their guesses about deaths were consistently unrelated to their opinions about
Iraq. Only once did estimates of deaths in Iraq produce a meaningful difference in
opinions about what to do in Iraq. Clearly, if Americans don’t know what reality looks
like in Iraq (deaths), this calls into question the cumulative casualty hypothesis.
On the other hand, participants’ tolerance for hypothetical casualties was consistently
related to their opinions about Iraq. Those with higher tolerance were more favorable in
their assessments and were more likely to prefer to “stick it out” in Iraq.
Political variables, like whether the participant had voted for Bush in 2004 were also
strongly related to opinions abut Iraq.
Our claim about the complexity of casualty data stems from the inconsistent main effects
we find for our experimental manipulations. Sometimes the stories about American dead
directly influence opinions, but their effects are also often moderated by voting for Bush
and/or acceptance for hypothetical casualties. Likewise, the body count stories moved
people consistently in a “pro-war” direction, but this effect was not always statistically
significant. The effect of exposure to the body count frame was also mediated by the
acceptance of hypothetical casualties and voting for Bush. What you think about Iraq
after exposure to different ways of presenting casualties usually depends on your prior
convictions.
Conclusion
The impact of casualty sensitivity on public support for U.S. military
intervention/occupation is complex and subtle, as are the determinants of casualty
sensitivity. This area of research has moved far beyond univariate, monotonic, and
cumulative observations about the relationship between increasing casualties and
decreasing public support over time in the Vietnam and Korea cases. Our results support
the work of Gartner, Larson, Feaver and Gelpi and others, by demonstrating that elite
framing and counter framing, hypothetical estimates of acceptable/unacceptable
casualties, understanding of the objectives of the war, previous perceptions of
success/failure, partisan and ideological differences, and demographic factors all appear
to affect the public response to information about U.S. casualties. We build on this
previous work by revealing the differences between the impact of body-count and
casualty-ratio frames and by focusing on marginal casualties in an embedded
experimental survey. While we cannot make grand claims about the generalizability of
our results, given our reliance on student participants; we can modestly suggest that our
research sheds light on a previously unexplored area.
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