Author's Keywords: Unipolar stability, balancing, Balance of Threat (Offensive Intentions),Democratic Peace	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: International Studies Association URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69948_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

García Iommi, Lucrecia. "Balancing in the Aftermath of the Cold War: An Answer to the Unipolar Stability Puzzle" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69948_index.html>

García Iommi, L. , 2005-03-05 "Balancing in the Aftermath of the Cold War: An Answer to the Unipolar Stability Puzzle" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-25 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69948_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Ceteris paribus, the more a potential challenger is domestically organized like the liberal democratic hegemonic power, the United States, the less likely it is to balance American primacy. Balancing behavior is considered in this paper as continuum between low balancing and high balancing, measured from 1990 to 2003 in terms of military expenditure - i.e., the higher the military expenditure, the higher the balancing level. Following Balance of Threat theory, balancing is a function of geographical proximity, aggregate power, offensive capabilities, and offensive intentions. Controlling for the first three variables in the bilateral relations between the U.S. and the potential challengers, offensive intentions alone explain the differences in the level of balancing between challengers. The measurement of offensive intentions, though, is an unresolved problem. This paper states that offensive intentions can be considered to be a function of domestic alikeness - that is, the degree in which the potential balancer resembles US liberal democracy, a concept that draws from Democratic Peace Theory and from Hegemonic Stability Theory, as well. The idea is that those potential challengers that share US liberal and democratic domestic arrangements have little incentives to balance against US power, and therefore hardly balance US power. On the contrary, those potential challengers that have a different (not liberal and democratic) domestic arrangement are expected to highly balance US power. The findings, the fact liberal democracies not only do not fight each other, but they balance each other to a lesser extent, are consistent with the hypothesis. Also they point to the fact that the more liberal democracies we have in the international system, the more stable the current distribution of power will be. Finally, it opens the possibility to extend the universe of cases against which IR scholars have tested Democratic Peace Theory, addressing the small-N problem that this theory faces.

Why the International System is closer to a Liberal Domestic Process than we think; or the Flawed Premises of Democratic Peace Theory and of its Realist Critics

Does Democratic Peace Theory Better Than the Power Transition Theory in Explaining International Security?