3
through the curtailment of civil and political liberties.
4
Human rights norms have been rejected
by Malaysian leaders as reflective of “Western” ideas and values, and thus as incompatible with
the present stage of economic, political, and social development in countries of the global
South.
5
And, reflecting the limited spaces available for civil society action, Malaysia’s gender
violence movement is held together by only four key women’s organizations. South Africa, in
contrast, has made a dramatic shift from being the pariah of the international community during
the decades of apartheid
6
to being among the world’s most vocal defenders of democracy and
universal human rights.
7
Rather than curtailing spaces for civil society, the South African
government has often relied on social movement actors to take on tasks that would normally fall
under the responsibility of the state. The end of apartheid thus led to the proliferation of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) – including hundreds of organizations that are involved, in
varying degrees, in responding to gender violence.
A number of scholars have argued that the emergence of social movements, their degree of
organization, and the tactics that are pursued are determined by structurally-based “political
opportunities,” tied to factors such as the regime-type of the government or its willingness to
tolerate dissent.
8
In light of the distinct political opportunity structures in Malaysia (restrictive)
and South Africa (permissive), we would expect very different social movement configurations.
But although the size of the gender violence movements in Malaysia and South Africa differ
substantially, similar patterns in the priorities and practices of activists in the two countries are
nonetheless evident. The degree of political “openness” is thus not in itself sufficient to
understand the forms social movement practices have taken in these two cases.
4
See Khoo and Loh Kok Wah 2002; Stivens 2003;
5
See Khoo 2002; Manan 1999; Mauzy 1997; Verma 2002; and Weiss and Hassan 2003.
6
The regular condemnation of the South African apartheid regime by the UN began in the
early 1950s. South Africa was ultimately excluded from UN General Assembly activities (see
UN G.A. Res. 3324 E (XXIX) of 16 December 1974), was subjected to an arms embargo (see
UN S.C. Res. 418 (1977) of 7 November 1977), and became the target of a boycott on sports (see
the International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports, G.A. Res. 40/64 of 10 December
1985).
7
In assuming leadership of the country, the African National Congress (ANC) prioritized the
establishment of mechanisms to protect peoples’ human rights and to provide avenues for
redressing decades of rights violations. Moreover, in drafting the new South African
Constitution, the ANC relied heavily on the norms and principles established under the UN
Declaration on Human Rights (UN G.A. Res. 217 (III) of 10 December 1948), the two
International Covenants of 1966 (UN G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966), the
European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, EST No. 5 (Rome, 4 November
1950)), and the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/ rev.
5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982)).
8
See Boudreau 1996; Kitscheldt 1986; Kriesi 1995; and Tarrow 1991.
Convention