19
alleged that Talisman’s commercial activities in the Sudan were exacerbating existing tensions and
contributing to the intensification of conflict. In its own defence, Talisman claimed that its corporate
activities in the Sudan had improved living conditions for people in the Western Upper Nile region of its
operations and that oil revenues from its project had been used to build medical facilities, schools, and
new water wells.
Talisman’s involvement in the Sudan had begun in 1998 when it bought out a 25 percent stake held by
Arakis– another Canadian company– in the GNPOC oil consortium.
13
Gagnon et al have argued that
Talisman walked into an extremely volatile situation with a weak peace accord not accepted by all parties
of the conflict in place and rising disputes over how oil revenues would be distributed amongst the
Sudanese population (Gagnon et al 2003).
14
Within this strained environment, the potential value of the
oil concessions and the resulting imperative that these operations not be impeded by ongoing political
issues, resulted in the Sudanese government accelerating its use of militias for ‘counter-insurgency’
operations in the Western Upper Nile Region. Thus, through proxy armies, the Sudanese government
engaged in practices of depopulation, forced migration, rape, torture, violence, and terror to establish a
security perimeter around the oil developments to protect them from attack as well as to further their initial
goals of crushing rebel movements. As such, Gagnon et al have argued that Talisman’s presence in the
Sudan not only intensified levels of conflict between the government and rebels, it extended the conflict
zone outside of traditional areas of strife, created tensions between rebel groups, and increased the
levels of population displacement.
15
Revenues generated by oil production increased dramatically from 1998-2000 with 25 percent of them
going directly to Sudan’s central government (Gagnon et al 2003: 20). Moreover, oil development left
13
Other members included the China National Petroleum Corporation, Malaysia Petronas, and Sudan
State Petroleum. No American based corporations were involved in developing these concessions as
government sanctions against the Sudan prevented any American citizen from doing business with the
country.
14
Their report Deconstructing Engagement is by far the most comprehensive Canadian examination of
the failures of Canadian corporate regulation abroad.
15
It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of Sudanese citizens were affected by these counter-
insurgency actions at the time.
Convention