2
Introduction
The amount of instability, conflict and sheer human suffering that has
characterized the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since the end of the
Mobutist rule in 1997 has been staggering even in light of the tumultuous history
of that country. The failure of democratic transition, be it under Mobutu during
the early 1990s (Young 1994) or since his demise, has led many observers to
conclude that the DRC is emblematic of the “failed-state” syndrome. The concept
of “failed states” has been utilized to analyze states which do not conform to a
preconceived image of functioning states. While the concept has experienced a
revival in the post-Cold war era (Zartman 1995), it has long been applied to the
African continent. There, debates over “weak,” “bloated,” “impotent” or “soft”
states have occurred since the late 1970s with varying degrees of critical
questioning of the term itself (seeFatton 1989).
Although one would assume the meaning of the term to be fraught with
complexities, in a recent account of “failed states” Rotberg (2003) provides a
rather simple explanation: “Failed states can no longer provide positive political
goods to their inhabitants.” He goes on to state that positive political goods
revolve around the expectations and obligations that inform political culture and
the social contract underlying the state. More specifically, security is a key
political good the lack of which, in turn, is a strong indicator of a “failed state.”
And providing security means:
… to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations,
and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats
to or attaches upon the national order and social
structure, to prevent crime and any related dangers to
domestic human security; and to enable citizens to
resolve their disputes with the state and with their
Convention