3
The question, then, is to what extent partisanship influences economic
policy making in the age of neoliberalism and globalization. This question has
received little systematic, cross-national attention in the Latin American context,
yet it is a critical question to ask for a variety of reasons. First, it sheds important
light on the actual workings of the international financial system. The
conventional wisdom is that Latin American governments have little or no
autonomy in the design of their economic policies because of the leverage of the
“Washington Consensus” actors (IMF, World Bank, U.S. Departments of State
and the Treasury), and Wall Street. There is strong evidence, for example, that
even left-wing governments, such as the recently elected Worker’s Party in
Brazil, actively cater to the whims and concerns of the international financial
community.
It is hard to ague against the view that Wall Street and Washington
Consensus preferences do constrain Latin American governments. But at the
same time, the rate and extent of neoliberal reforms have varied considerably
across the region. Furthermore, there is also evidence that international investors
do not focus on all aspects of economic reform and all indicators of economic
performance (e.g. Santiso, 2003). In fact, there is evidence that investors respond
primarily to trends within OECD economies (Maxfield, ). Thus, Latin American
governments may enjoy some discretion in which reforms they pursue and the
extent to which they pursue them.
Convention