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The war between Iran and Iraq (1980-1988) began when Saddam Hussein attacked
Iran because he sought territorial gains and the glory and wealth that comes with it. The
Iranians defended their territory as part of a religious struggle. While Iraq had superior
weapons, and had in the first few weeks occupied some 7000 kilometers of Iranian
territory due to their superior weapons, Iran managed to repel these attacks.
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Iraq’s
military advantage led many policymakers across Europe and in the United States to
expect a quick Iraqi victory. In addition, the mullahs had almost no experience with
domestic or international politics.
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For these reasons the survival of the Islamic Republic
was rather unexpected. Iran’s greater population, and their willingness to fight and die for
the nation, if not for religion, was the advantage Iran had over Iraq. Neither of these
advantages allowed either side to achieve a complete victory and so the war dragged on.
For the first four years of his term both superpowers wanted Perez de Cuellar to
remain on the sidelines of the conflict. From the American perspective, consistent with its
double containment strategy, it was advantageous for Iraq and Iran to fight with each
other because this would leave both in a weakened condition. It was only after Iran had
scored a number of military successes that the United States thought it was important for
the international community to become involved. The Reagan Administration feared that
either Iraq would end up another Islamic Republic or that oil flows would be interrupted.
It was in this context that the United States provided Iraq with certain intelligence, and
also delivered to it certain materials useful in the making of chemical and biological
weapons.
Although the UN Security Council was silent on the use of chemical weapons, Perez
de Cuellar undertook a number of diplomatic missions to address the issue. He was
horrified by the use of chemical weapons, but his personal views were largely ignored by
the conflicting parties and by the Security Council.
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Further efforts of a humanitarian
nature concerned Perez de Cuellar’s efforts to stop the ‘war of the cities’ and the
bombing of civilian areas. Although neither side exercised restraint for very long, the
Secretary General’s efforts spared a number of lives.
Eventually, Perez de Cuellar was able to broker a peace agreement between the
parties because each side despaired of military victory,
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the permanent members of the
Security Council had encouraged him “to do what you think is right,”
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and because the
Secretary General was viewed as an impartial or neutral player. On his own initiative,
Perez de Cuellar rewrote Resolution 598 in a way that eventually gained Iranian
acquiescence. So the Iranians came to rely on the Secretary General, even though they
believed that Iraqi aggression had not been properly condemned by the Security Council.
Hostilities ultimately end on August 20, 1988 after the Secretary General held final
discussions between the foreign ministers of both countries. (Perez de Cuellar had a great
74
Robin Wright, In the Name of God. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 25. A. Taheri, The Spirit of
Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution. (London: Hutchinson Publishers, 1985), 272.
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Wright, 24. Iran’s population was three times bigger than Iraq’s.
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Interview with former Secretariat official, 28 September 2004.
77
Pilgrimage for Peace, 131.
78
Picco, 79.
Convention