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WEIGHTED VOTING, RELATIVE VOTING POWER,
AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM
Abstract: Recently, Joseph Schwartzberg proposed a weighted voting scheme as part of an overhaul
of the UN Security Council. In our paper, we take Schwartzberg’s proposal as a starting point to
consider alternative schemes for reapportioning influence in the Security Council. One shortcoming
of Schwartzberg’s proposal is that he does not consider the problem of relative voting power as
opposed to simply defining voting weights (i.e., the percentages of votes held by actors). We first
briefly review the various reform proposals that involve changes to the Security Council’s decision
rules. We then calculate voting weights based on Schwartzberg’s “entitlement quotients.” We include
two formulations of voting weights that differ from Schwartzberg’s in how the component measures
are weighted. After this, we define several measures of voting power, derived from simple
cooperative games, which can be used to assess voting power in weighted voting systems. Results of
voting power analyses are then presented. We conclude with an assessment of the limitations of
weighted voting schemes for Security Council reform.
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the UN Security Council (UNSC) embody two
different methods, based on different underlying principles, for their members to make collective
decisions. The UNGA’s one-country, one-vote decision rule reflects the principle of the sovereign
equality of states, as codified in the UN Charter (Chapter I, Article 2). The UNSC departs from this
principle by providing a veto to each of its five permanent members, in recognition of their much
greater power and influence. Each of these alternatives has serious shortcomings. In the UNGA,
Estonia, with a population of 1.36 million, has the same formal voting influence as India, with a
population of over one billion. In the UNSC one permanent member, say France with a population
of 55 million, can veto initiatives favored by all other UN members. The use of different decision
rules in the two UN bodies reflects a compromise aimed at reconciling the two contradictory
principles. The codification of sovereign equality was contested by great powers who were
legitimately concerned that members with smaller economies and populations would consistently
outvote them in the UNGA. At the same time, the vast majority of lesser powers understandably did
not want all decisions to rest with an oligopoly of great powers.
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Over time the results of this
Convention