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Vetoing Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on International Trade Agreements. |
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Abstract:
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Since World War II, preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have become increasingly pervasive features of the international economic system. A great deal of research has addressed the economic consequences of these arrangements, but far less effort has been made to identify the political factors leading states to enter them, especially the domestic influences on PTA formation. We investigate the domestic political factors affecting whether countries enter preferential trade agreements (PTAs). We focus on the number of veto players within a country and hypothesize that the probability of forming a PTA declines as the number of such players rises. Our data, covering 194 countries from 1950 to 1999, strongly support this hypothesis. Holding various political and economic factors constant, increasing the number of veto players within a country reduces the probability of signing a PTA by a sizable amount. |
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veto (177), player (117), intern (80), polit (76), domest (72), trade (72), p (68), countri (66), state (62), agreement (58), v (57), 1 (55), cooper (55), status (53), polici (52), quo (52), pta (51), prefer (48), f (47), estim (46), model (45), |
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Association:
Name: International Studies Association
URL: http://www.isanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Milner, Helen. "Vetoing Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on International Trade Agreements." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p70626_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Milner, H. , 2005-03-05 "Vetoing Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on International Trade Agreements." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p70626_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Since World War II, preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have become increasingly pervasive features of the international economic system. A great deal of research has addressed the economic consequences of these arrangements, but far less effort has been made to identify the political factors leading states to enter them, especially the domestic influences on PTA formation. We investigate the domestic political factors affecting whether countries enter preferential trade agreements (PTAs). We focus on the number of veto players within a country and hypothesize that the probability of forming a PTA declines as the number of such players rises. Our data, covering 194 countries from 1950 to 1999, strongly support this hypothesis. Holding various political and economic factors constant, increasing the number of veto players within a country reduces the probability of signing a PTA by a sizable amount. |
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.pdf |
| Page count: |
47 |
| Word count: |
12262 |
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| Vetoing Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on International Trade Agreements Edward D. Mansfield Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia PA 19104 215-898-7657 (phone) 215-573-2073 (fax) emansfie@sas.upenn.edu Helen V. Milner B. C. Forbes Professor of Politics and International Affairs Department of Politics Princeton University Princeton NJ 08544 609-258-0181 (phone) 201-301-9156 (fax) hmilner@princeton.edu Jon C. Pevehouse Assistant Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science University of Wisconsin Madison WI 53706 608-262-4839 |
| (Table 3 continued) Note: Parameters are estimated using logistic regression after including a cubic spline function with no knots. Entries in parentheses are Huber standard errors clustered on the dyad. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. All tests of statistical significance are two-tailed. a Veto Pointsi is the residual of a regression of Veto Pointsi on Regime Typei. Veto Pointsj is the residual of a regression of Veto Pointsj on Regime Typej. Since the values of these |
Similar Titles:
Self-Execution and Political-Execution: The Status of International Agreements in Domestic Law
Tempering International Trade Relations and Domestic Veto Players: A Dynamic Model for Trade Liberalization
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