Author's Keywords: Korea, ideas, institutions, protectionism, electoral institution, FTA	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: International Studies Association URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p70652_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Yu, Hyun-Seok. "Ideas or Institutions? : Explaining the Protectionism in South Korea" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p70652_index.html>

Yu, H. , 2005-03-05 "Ideas or Institutions? : Explaining the Protectionism in South Korea" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p70652_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: The purpose of this study is to explain the protectionist tendency manifested in the course of Korea-Chile FTA. FTA is a measure to increase trade volume by mutual tariff elimination. Although FTA has discriminatory nature to non-member nations it basically opens up domestic market especially when a nation has multiple FTAs. However, we could observe strong presence of protectionism in Korea-Chile FTA negotiations and ratification process. Several commodities - apples and pears for Chile and freezer and washing machine for Korea- which both countries are especially interested in were excluded from the tariff elimination list mainly due to the strong opposition of Korean agricultural sector. Two parties have settled for agreement which fails to realize the economic potential of the FTA. Moreover, during the ratification process the Korean government provided huge compensation in order to soften up the angry farmers and oppositional coalition in the National Assembly. While the government aimed at trade liberalization, the outcome only confirmed the strong protectionism in Korea. The most important variable here is the role of electoral institution(district apportionment institution) which enables agricultural interests to overrepresent in the National Assembly. The existence of protectionist culture alone cannot explain the power of agricultural interests. Electoral institution created by the political calculation has unintended implication to trade policy. Thus, the focus on trade-related institutions has critical limitation in explaining the protectionist policy of Korea. As long as the agricultural interests are overrepresented in the National Assembly, Korea’s trade policy especially related to the agricultural market opening will continuously incline to protectionism. Even in negotiation process, the government has no choice but to consider the possibility of ratification in the National Assembly hence throws protectionist goals to negotiation table. A recent negotiation over rice market opening show how powerful the agricultural interests in Korea. Again the sheer number of agricultural population does not explain Korea’s inclination to protectionism. The electoral institution which creates overrepresentation of agricultural interests in the legislative politics should be taken seriously.

National Interests and the Development of the European Union's CFSP and ESDP: The Role of Domestic Political Preferences in Selecting the Level of Action and Institutions for Advancing Foreign and Defense Policy

The Impact of Policy Networks in Agricultural Trade Liberalization During the Uruguay and Doha Rounds: The Role of Ideas, Interests and Institutions