28
of poor planning and design, inadequate follow-through, delayed implementation and
poor empirical results also characterize this project at the local level.
Poor planning and design is most apparent in terms of the Doba region’s
allotment of 5% of the 90% of royalties (after 10% goes to the Future Generations Fund).
NGOs have repeatedly expressed concerns that the 5% figure is too low and may not be
adequate to ensure that the region actually benefits from oil production.
112
Of even
greater concern is the fact that the Bank has no apparent justification for how or why it
came up with this figure. As the Inspection Panel observed, the project appraisal
documents “neither suggest that any targeted studies of how to determine the appropriate
share were carried out, nor do they cite any review material that underpinned the choice
of 5 per cent.”
113
In response, the Bank’s management could only claim that this decision
“was arrived at through an internal political process.”
114
The Doba region also suffers from a major design flaw in the revenue
management system. Article 8 of the revenue management law allows the president, by
decree, to unilaterally alter the amount of revenue flowing to the Doba oil-producing
region after five years.
115
In Nigeria, the revenues going to the oil-producing region were
progressively lowered from 50% to 1.5% over the course of three decades and they now
ostensibly stand at 13%.
116
Given this track record and the fact that the Bank’s ability to
influence this project “will decline significantly over time,”
117
allowing this 5% figure to
be changed unilaterally by decree after five years is a fatal design flaw.
The oil-producing region has also suffered from broken promises and massive
delays in implementation. A number of so-called “urgent projects,” mainly in Doba and
Bébédjia were publicly announced but then cancelled due to a lack of funding in the
Convention