1
Introduction
Currently, the major axis of dispute in international relations (IR) scholarship is
characterized as the one between rationalism ([neo]realism and [neo]liberalism) and
constructivism (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998; Fearon and Wendt 2002). Although
neo-realists and neo-liberals disagree on how much international institutions can mitigate the
constraining effects of anarchy on state behavior, they adopt nearly the same methods or common
research approaches. Their shared methodological tool is rational choice or game-theoretic
analysis, thus they share the view that the state as a unitary actor is by and large rational in
seeking its power or wealth. In short, rationalists attempt to explain state behavior by relying on
the analytical frame of instrumental rationality based upon utilitarian assumptions. On the other
hand, constructivists assume the state as a cognitive or social actor rather than as an atomistic
individual entity. According to constructivism, states’ identities and interests are not exogenously
given, but formed through social interactions and practices among states (Wendt 1992). In
constructivists’ view, the state that is described by rationalists is largely under-socialized. They
stress the importance of social or ideational factors or structures (e.g., individual or collective
identities and ideas) in understanding state behavior. In other words, we need to examine closely
how states socially interact in inter-subjectively constructed contexts for an appropriate
understanding or explanation of state behavior.
I then do not see that rationalism and constructivism are always competitive in understanding
and explaining state behavior, but that they can be complementary in important ways. This paper
seeks a ‘bridge-building enterprise’ between rationalism and constructivism in explaining the
contested process of formation of a regional identity in Asia. Whereas there have been some
studies on international security issues that combine a rationalist approach with a constructivist
one (see, for instance, Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002), international political economy (IPE) is a
much less developed area in terms of this bridge-building effort. In this paper, I attempt to
demonstrate that we require both rationalism and constructivism to have an appropriate
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