2
Abstract. The evolution in the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity has led to shifting patters of
alliances in world politics. After 9/11, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use its overwhelming
military power to deal with potential or real threats. Contrary to its policy of embedded its power in the economic
and security institutions of the post-1945 period, the United States increasingly views the multilateral order as an
unreasonable restraint on the exercise of hegemonic power. What does this new context mean for Britain? Going
back to 1997, the first New Labour government added an internationalist dimension to the traditional roles of
acting as a loyal ally to the United States and serving as a bridge across the transatlantic divide. The Iraq war of
2003 showed that the bridge could not bear the weight of the disagreement between
‘
old Europe
’
and the new
conservatives in Washington. As the transatlantic architecture came crashing down, the hopes of Old Labour
internationalists came down with it.
1
‘
It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs
’
.
2
These words, spoken by Woodrow Wilson in 1913, would have sounded just as propitious if
uttered by Prime Minister Tony Blair prior to taking office in 1997. During his brief period as
leader of the Labour opposition, Blair made no speech on British foreign and defence policy.
His colleague Peter Mandelson was once moved to scribble
‘
won
’
t TB fight wars?
’
on a re-
draft of a Labour Party constitutional document that had no mention of defence.
3
After seven
years in office, the British Prime Minister has deployed UK troops on enforcement actions on
as many occasions,
4
more than any leader in modern political history.
The phrase
‘
Blair
Doctrine
’
has been used by the media to signify the belief that force can be harnessed for good
ends: in other words, to enhance security and build democracy. As we approach the end of
Labour
’
s second term in office, it does indeed seem that Blair
’
s record will in large measure
be judged by how has dealt
‘
chiefly with foreign affairs
’
.
1
This paper is an amended and revised version of an article that appeared in International Affairs 80.5 (October
2004). I would like to thank a number of colleagues who advised me on it: Lawrence Freedman, John Kampfner,
Christopher Hill, John Keane, Theo Farrell, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline Soper, Rhiannon Vickers, Paul
Williams and Nick Wheeler.
2
Quoted in Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy
(Washington: Brookings, 2003), p. 5.
3
John Kampfner, Blair’s wars (London: The Free Press, 2004), p. 9.
4
Kamfner’s calculation, writing in 2003, is ‘five times in six years’. On his list, he includes Iraq (1998 and 2003),
Kosovo (1999), Sierra Leone (2000), Afghanistan (2002). If Kampfner’s broad definition of war is used, then his
list is incomplete. It ought to include deployments to the INTERFET operation in East Timor (1999) and the
participation in the EU led peace support operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003). I am grateful to
Paul Williams for pointing this out.
Convention