9
reconnaissance, precision air power, and headquarters planning. Without capabilities
such as these, the cost of even smaller scale crisis management missions becomes
prohibitive for the European democracies so that in a very practical sense, common
European security policy depends on U.S. arms.
NATO perpetuates this dependency in a number of ways. While it is true that
recent secretary generals have consistently urged a greater defense contribution from the
European pillar through programs such as the Defense Capabilities Initiative (??), NATO
interoperability standards are largely driven by U.S. technologies. NATO encourages
specialization on the part of NATO partners in order to complement Alliance capabilities
that are centered not on European national defense requirements but forces in the United
States’ European Command. Starting from the Supreme Allied Commander, the United
States retains much of the military authority within the alliance. While American
officials may complain that European allies are not fulfilling all of their promises to share
the burden of common defense, European personnel and equipment participating with
NATO operate within a U.S. strategic framework. The United States, on the other hand,
does not automatically grant the European Union access to member contributions that
have since rolled into NATO common assets.
7
It also pressures the EU against building
separate facilities, such as headquarters, that would duplicate, and could thus function
independently of, NATO common assets.
8
The U.S. advantage in hard power, reinforces U.S. attempts to increase its soft
power over Europe. Formally, of course, the Alliance only responds on the basis of a
7
Council of the European Union, “Background: EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and
Berlin Plus,” (2003), available at
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-
11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf
.
8
Holworth (2003).
Convention