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A
BSTRACT
Mediation theory identifies the threat of mediation withdrawal as a source of leverage and,
therefore, as one of the most important prerequisites for success. However, previous research has
not examined whether different types of actors differ in their ability to be credible. Not all types
of mediators are likely to follow through on a threat of disengagement. I argue that democracies
and organisations have internal audiences that reward mediation efforts, regardless of outcome,
and therefore, their threats of withdrawal are non-credible. In contrast, non-democratic countries
can make their mediation disengagement threats credible, since they do not have to take into
account their audience and, therefore, get no positive payoff for being involved in mediation
efforts. Hence, non-democratic countries should be expected to outperform democracies and
organisations as efficient peace brokers. Using new data on mediation by states and organisations
in all intrastate, armed conflict between 1989-2003, the paper examines this argument. The results
give support to these claims. Furthermore, an analysis of the contexts in which mediation occur
suggests that this correlation is not due to a selection effect.
Convention