(Page 1 of 38) - WAR WITHOUT VIOLENCE: THE POTENTIAL AND PITFALLS OF NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE IN THREE SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS authored by Stephan, Maria.

WAR WITHOUT VIOLENCE: THE POTENTIAL AND PITFALLS OF

NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE IN THREE SELF-DETERMINATION

MOVEMENTS

By: MARIA J. STEPHAN

(PhD Candidate, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy)

Submitted For: 2005 International Studies Association Annual Conference, Honolulu

E-mail:

Maria.## email not listed ##

Draft Only: Please Do Not Cite Without Permission

Abstract:
This paper examines the role played by nonviolent struggle in three self-determination
conflicts pitting national movements against state occupiers: the first Palestinian Intifada, the
Kosovo Albanian independence movement, and the East Timorese independence movement.
The first part of the paper theorizes nonviolent struggle, which involves the wielding of political,
economic, social, and moral power in contentious interaction between collective actors, as a form
of asymmetric warfare subject to the same limits and constraints as armed struggle. Strategic
thinking is as important to the former as to the latter. It asks under what conditions nonviolent
struggle can be effective in non-democratic situations, namely occupations or quasi-occupations,
where the opponent does not depend on the consent and cooperation of the subject population to
maintain control over the territory. In answering this theoretical question, the paper proposes a
modification to Gene Sharp’s consent theory of power and examines the relationship between
political ju-jitsu, transnational solidarity, and the nonviolent counter-offensive strategy.

The second part of the paper examines how Palestinians, Kosovo Albanians, and East
Timorese used nonviolent direct action against states with overwhelming military and economic
power. In all three cases, nonviolent direct action (protests, civil disobedience, collective non-
cooperation, creation of parallel structures, etc.) imposed significant costs, moral and material,
on the state adversaries while promoting popular empowerment and self-rule within the resisting
populations. Only the East Timorese popular movement, however, adopted a step-by-step
approach to achieving independence.

The proactive nonviolent strategy employed by the East Timorese, which included
transferring the battlefield to the opponent’s heartland and activating transnational
solidarity networks, was decisive to their political victory. Notwithstanding their many
successes, neither the Palestinian nor the Kosovo Albanian popular movements used a robust
counter-offensive strategy that targeted their opponents’ most important centers of gravity. They
did not find the right balance between protest and active engagement that involved extending the
nonviolent battlefield. The East Timorese movement, significantly, succeeded in creating a
unified front that increased its legitimacy and leverage vis-à-vis the international community.