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NATO's Response Force: Does It Have the Capacity to Transform NATO's Force Structure?
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shape issues even though it was in the service of NATO nations. Moreover, NATO planning aims in principle to affect the entire national force structure, which is the reason why NATO planning depends on the collective possession of all national defense data and the regular updating of these. In practice this takes place through the Defense Planning Questionnaire issued annually. Finally, NATO planning has institutionalized peer pressure in the shape of multilateral reviews where individual nations explain their achievements – or lack hereof – to the other allies. The EU philosophy was to give up on this highly institutionalized approach in favor of a loser approach relying first and foremost on national will – because in a diffuse strategic environment there could be no other standard of measurement.
30
Thus, the EU has sought to keep the mechanism to a
minimum: catalogues of needed capabilities are established on the basis of strategic ambitions and current military inventories, and nations are then asked to commit themselves to acquire these capabilities. Increasingly the EU has asked its members to multinationalize force planning but still on the basis of voluntary, bottom-up processes (such as the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and later the Battle Groups).
Still, and though the philosophy was new, the question remains whether this was a real alternative to NATO force planning? In light of the EU’s explicit commitment to undertake peacekeeping and –making operations only and leave larger defense operations to NATO, it could be that the CDM was a part of this emerging division of transatlantic labor. Was it not possible that the larger EU members in the wake of Kosovo realized the significant costs of realizing merely a Kosovo ambition (i.e., the original headline goal) and therefore agreed to sidetrack larger ambitions on behalf of the EU? If this was the case in 2000-2002 then the American proposal for the NRF represents not so much a clash of visions as a contribution to an emerging collective planning system made up of disjointed but coordinated mechanisms.
Some signs do support this contention. First, in this period there was an absence of strategic ambition to rival NATO: the report on security and defense policy that was issued in conjunction with the Nice treaty, December 2000, speaks of an “overall crisis-management and conflict-prevention capability.” Moreover, the introduction continues, the EU ambition is “to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises,” and it should lead to “a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in the management of crises with due regard for the two organisations’ decision-making autonomy.”
31
Thus, the EU does not aim to do
high-end tasks and aims to establish a partnership with NATO at the middle range – which from NATO’s perspective is embodied in the Berlin Plus agreement of 1999. Perhaps most significantly is the acknowledgement that the EU responds to crises – it thus does not seek a strategic lead to shape the world in its image.
Secondly, while it is not difficult to find harsh statements issued as warnings to the EU by US policy-makers, these often reflect negotiations and can obscure the contours of a strategic compromise centered on a type of division of labor. The harsh statements first: Madeleine Albright drew red lines subsequent to the St. Mâlo summit in late 1998 with her three D’s (no duplication, no de-coupling, and no discrimination); Strobe Talbott warned in 1999 against a European pillar that might have begun inside NATO but could end up growing out of it; and Nicholas Burns in October 2003 described the EU as the “most significant threat to NATO’s future.” Still, and significantly, the Bush administration – prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks – was warming to a deal according to which the US would support the EU’s capacity to handle regional affairs in return for
30
Rynning, “Why Not NATO? Military Planning in the European Union,” Journal of Strategic Studies, March, 26, 1,
2003, pp. 53-72
31
Presidency report on ESDP, Annex VI to Presidency conclusions,
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.en0.htm.
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9
shape issues even though it was in the service of NATO nations. Moreover, NATO planning aims
in principle to affect the entire national force structure, which is the reason why NATO planning
depends on the collective possession of all national defense data and the regular updating of these.
In practice this takes place through the Defense Planning Questionnaire issued annually. Finally,
NATO planning has institutionalized peer pressure in the shape of multilateral reviews where
individual nations explain their achievements – or lack hereof – to the other allies. The EU
philosophy was to give up on this highly institutionalized approach in favor of a loser approach
relying first and foremost on national will – because in a diffuse strategic environment there could
be no other standard of measurement.
30
Thus, the EU has sought to keep the mechanism to a
minimum: catalogues of needed capabilities are established on the basis of strategic ambitions and
current military inventories, and nations are then asked to commit themselves to acquire these
capabilities. Increasingly the EU has asked its members to multinationalize force planning but still
on the basis of voluntary, bottom-up processes (such as the European Capabilities Action Plan
(ECAP) and later the Battle Groups).
Still, and though the philosophy was new, the question remains whether this was a real alternative
to NATO force planning? In light of the EU’s explicit commitment to undertake peacekeeping and
–making operations only and leave larger defense operations to NATO, it could be that the CDM
was a part of this emerging division of transatlantic labor. Was it not possible that the larger EU
members in the wake of Kosovo realized the significant costs of realizing merely a Kosovo
ambition (i.e., the original headline goal) and therefore agreed to sidetrack larger ambitions on
behalf of the EU? If this was the case in 2000-2002 then the American proposal for the NRF
represents not so much a clash of visions as a contribution to an emerging collective planning
system made up of disjointed but coordinated mechanisms.
Some signs do support this contention. First, in this period there was an absence of strategic
ambition to rival NATO: the report on security and defense policy that was issued in conjunction
with the Nice treaty, December 2000, speaks of an “overall crisis-management and conflict-
prevention capability.” Moreover, the introduction continues, the EU ambition is “to launch and
conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises,” and it should lead to “a
genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in the management of crises with due
regard for the two organisations’ decision-making autonomy.”
31
Thus, the EU does not aim to do
high-end tasks and aims to establish a partnership with NATO at the middle range – which from
NATO’s perspective is embodied in the Berlin Plus agreement of 1999. Perhaps most significantly
is the acknowledgement that the EU responds to crises – it thus does not seek a strategic lead to
shape the world in its image.
Secondly, while it is not difficult to find harsh statements issued as warnings to the EU by US
policy-makers, these often reflect negotiations and can obscure the contours of a strategic
compromise centered on a type of division of labor. The harsh statements first: Madeleine Albright
drew red lines subsequent to the St. Mâlo summit in late 1998 with her three D’s (no duplication, no
de-coupling, and no discrimination); Strobe Talbott warned in 1999 against a European pillar that
might have begun inside NATO but could end up growing out of it; and Nicholas Burns in October
2003 described the EU as the “most significant threat to NATO’s future.” Still, and significantly,
the Bush administration – prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks – was warming to a deal
according to which the US would support the EU’s capacity to handle regional affairs in return for
30
Rynning, “Why Not NATO? Military Planning in the European Union,” Journal of Strategic Studies, March, 26, 1,
2003, pp. 53-72
31
Presidency report on ESDP, Annex VI to Presidency conclusions,
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.en0.htm.
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