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PRESIDENT BUSH’S NARRATIVE OF ‘DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR’
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29 (52)
The improved information technology before battle for Fallujah has helped US marine forces,
not actually to recognize the enemy but rather to avoid the ‘friendly fire’ casualties that have
been mediatized other military operations.
Col. John Coleman, chief of staff for the Camp Pendleton-based 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, said new technology, rushed to Fallouja within days of the battle, allowed air and ground units to know the precise location of U.S. forces in real time. Among the improvements was better intelligence gathering by ScanEagle, the unmanned reconnaissance aircraft that circled Fallouja and continuously beamed back information on U.S. forces and the location and movement of insurgents. "I know of no blue-on-blue incidents," said Coleman, using military parlance for cases of members of a military force mistakenly killing their own fighters. In Fallouja, the chances for friendly-fire deaths were significant, as more than 10,000 Marines and soldiers and dozens of warplanes were involved in a crowded, fast-moving battle in an area roughly the size of a Southern California suburb. The U.S. used several unmanned aircraft during the battle. Unheard and largely unseen, they broadcast information to forces on the ground, air units and top brass at a command post. (Perry 2005)
Friendly fire casualties have been an issue for as long as the US has military forces since the
George Washington’s revolutionary war against British. Rather the ‘precision war’ is therefore
about not to kill own forces than killing the enemy as they are not counted anyhow. It was not
actually ‘precision war’ that took place in Fallujah but suburbian-scale territorial destroyment
operations as journalist describes the battle.
At least 72 Marines were killed during the eight-day battle. Most were killed while storming barricaded buildings where heavily armed insurgents, refusing to surrender, had taken refuge and attacked the Marines with small-arms fire. An estimated 1,600 insurgents died. The exact number of slain militants may never be known because many of them were buried beneath the rubble of buildings demolished by U.S. firepower. (Perry 2005)
Following the story above, it highlights the ‘different kind of war’ narrative still very well, at least
partly. This following description by the New York Times journalist from the US forces entering
into cities of Iraq in early November 2004 suits well for the President’s narrative.
The assault against Falluja began here Sunday night as American Special Forces and Iraqi troops burst into Falluja General Hospital and seized it within an hour. At 10 p.m., Iraqi troops clambered off seven-ton trucks, sprinting with American Special Forces soldiers around the side of the main building of the hospital, considered a refuge for insurgents and a center of propaganda against allied forces, entering the complex to bewildered looks from patients and employees… But unlike some of their past operations - most notably at a mosque courtyard in Samarra last month where they killed 4 insurgents and apprehended 24 others - the Iraqi special forces met little resistance this time. In all, there were 160 Iraqis found at the hospital, according to the American Special Forces commander, and at least five people suspected of being foreign fighters, including one from Syria… Dr. Rasheed al-Janabi, a general surgeon at the hospital, said many patients had left in the past few weeks in anticipation of an attack, though some, he said, including sev-eral wounded by American bombs, were in no shape to leave. "For many days we see on TV that an attack is coming," he said. Only about 30 percent of the Falluja population is left in the city, he said. He denied that the hospital was a haven for insurgents. "Fighters?" he shrugged. "I don't know about fighters." One of the Iraqi soldiers, sitting on a desk nearby, voiced scepticism. "Doctors from around here are afraid of the terrorists," said the soldier,
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| | Authors: Rantapelkonen, Jari. |
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29 (52)
The improved information technology before battle for Fallujah has helped US marine forces,
not actually to recognize the enemy but rather to avoid the ‘friendly fire’ casualties that have
been mediatized other military operations.
Col. John Coleman, chief of staff for the Camp Pendleton-based 1st Marine Expeditionary
Force, said new technology, rushed to Fallouja within days of the battle, allowed air and
ground units to know the precise location of U.S. forces in real time. Among the
improvements was better intelligence gathering by ScanEagle, the unmanned
reconnaissance aircraft that circled Fallouja and continuously beamed back information on
U.S. forces and the location and movement of insurgents. "I know of no blue-on-blue
incidents," said Coleman, using military parlance for cases of members of a military force
mistakenly killing their own fighters. In Fallouja, the chances for friendly-fire deaths were
significant, as more than 10,000 Marines and soldiers and dozens of warplanes were
involved in a crowded, fast-moving battle in an area roughly the size of a Southern
California suburb. The U.S. used several unmanned aircraft during the battle. Unheard and
largely unseen, they broadcast information to forces on the ground, air units and top brass
at a command post. (Perry 2005)
Friendly fire casualties have been an issue for as long as the US has military forces since the
George Washington’s revolutionary war against British. Rather the ‘precision war’ is therefore
about not to kill own forces than killing the enemy as they are not counted anyhow. It was not
actually ‘precision war’ that took place in Fallujah but suburbian-scale territorial destroyment
operations as journalist describes the battle.
At least 72 Marines were killed during the eight-day battle. Most were killed while storming
barricaded buildings where heavily armed insurgents, refusing to surrender, had taken
refuge and attacked the Marines with small-arms fire. An estimated 1,600 insurgents died.
The exact number of slain militants may never be known because many of them were
buried beneath the rubble of buildings demolished by U.S. firepower. (Perry 2005)
Following the story above, it highlights the ‘different kind of war’ narrative still very well, at least
partly. This following description by the New York Times journalist from the US forces entering
into cities of Iraq in early November 2004 suits well for the President’s narrative.
The assault against Falluja began here Sunday night as American Special Forces and Iraqi
troops burst into Falluja General Hospital and seized it within an hour. At 10 p.m., Iraqi
troops clambered off seven-ton trucks, sprinting with American Special Forces soldiers
around the side of the main building of the hospital, considered a refuge for insurgents and
a center of propaganda against allied forces, entering the complex to bewildered looks from
patients and employees…
But unlike some of their past operations - most notably at a mosque courtyard in Samarra
last month where they killed 4 insurgents and apprehended 24 others - the Iraqi special
forces met little resistance this time.
In all, there were 160 Iraqis found at the hospital, according to the American Special Forces
commander, and at least five people suspected of being foreign fighters, including one from
Syria… Dr. Rasheed al-Janabi, a general surgeon at the hospital, said many patients had
left in the past few weeks in anticipation of an attack, though some, he said, including sev-
eral wounded by American bombs, were in no shape to leave. "For many days we see on
TV that an attack is coming," he said. Only about 30 percent of the Falluja population is left
in the city, he said. He denied that the hospital was a haven for insurgents. "Fighters?" he
shrugged. "I don't know about fighters." One of the Iraqi soldiers, sitting on a desk nearby,
voiced scepticism. "Doctors from around here are afraid of the terrorists," said the soldier,
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