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EU Accession, State-Building, and the Limits of Good Governance in Central Eastern Europe
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drafting process, but slows down the process. The speedy procedures for the acquis-related legislation runthe risk of reducing parliaments to little more than rubber stamps and may undermine the overallinstitutionalisation of parliaments and weaken their legitimacy. In particular, the consolidation of thecommittee system may suffer, in that fast-tracking tends to bypass committees. Committees play animportant role in fostering the habits of political bargaining and cross-party co-operation. Fast-trackingwill therefore hamper the emergence of such a procedural culture” (Malova and Haughton 2002:112).
v
A similar point is made by Jean-Michel de Waele in his account of political parties in candidate states.
One of the features of these parties, he argues, is their existence within limited political horizons: “Lesparties d’Europe centrale et orientale…. ne ne bénéficiat que d’une marge de manoeuvre réduite par lesimperatives des réformes économiques et par le large consensus dont faisaient l’objet l’adhésion à l’OTANet à l’Union européenne. Dans ce cadre, les differences politiques sont réduites sur des question concreteset les partis n’ont de choix que de se différencier sur des questions plus symboliques telles que le passé, leregime communiste, le rapport à la religion etc… Ces problèmes ont conduit à une désillusion certaineenvers l’économie du marché et envers la démocratie parlementaire. Partout les taux de participation auxelections sont en chute constante, et le discredit des homes politiques est considerable.” (de Waele2003:97).
vi
These are figures for 1988.
vii
This is not to downplay the extent of diversity between CEE states. Poland and Hungary embraced
reforms, whilst Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania were more resistant. In the wordsof Elster, Offe and Preuss, these latter economies “were characterised by smaller private sectors, higherdegrees of monopolisation, less autonomous enterprises, and higher shares of CMEA trade than Hungary orPoland” (TK, 44). In Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, some reforms did take place in the late 1980s.
viii
On the limits of Solidarity as a revolutionary movement, Gillingham states clearly: “The problems of
post-communist Poland began with Solidarity itself. It freed Europe from communism but could notliberate Poland from its history of internal weakness. Now in disarray, Solidarity was a heterogeneousgrass-roots movement, at once democratic-socialist and Christian-conservative, bound together by idealismbut without the experience and know-how required either to reform the economy or govern a modernnation. Universally admired by the conservative and liberal/libertarian right in the West, Solidarity – onceinstalled in office after heroic and painful compromises with the martial law communist dictatorship ofGeneral Jarzelski during the 1980s – followed a socio-economic agenda as radical as any on the post WorldWar Two western European left” (Gillingham, 2003:432).
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| | Authors: Bickerton, Chris. |
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drafting process, but slows down the process. The speedy procedures for the acquis-related legislation run
the risk of reducing parliaments to little more than rubber stamps and may undermine the overall
institutionalisation of parliaments and weaken their legitimacy. In particular, the consolidation of the
committee system may suffer, in that fast-tracking tends to bypass committees. Committees play an
important role in fostering the habits of political bargaining and cross-party co-operation. Fast-tracking
will therefore hamper the emergence of such a procedural culture” (Malova and Haughton 2002:112).
v
A similar point is made by Jean-Michel de Waele in his account of political parties in candidate states.
One of the features of these parties, he argues, is their existence within limited political horizons: “Les
parties d’Europe centrale et orientale…. ne ne bénéficiat que d’une marge de manoeuvre réduite par les
imperatives des réformes économiques et par le large consensus dont faisaient l’objet l’adhésion à l’OTAN
et à l’Union européenne. Dans ce cadre, les differences politiques sont réduites sur des question concretes
et les partis n’ont de choix que de se différencier sur des questions plus symboliques telles que le passé, le
regime communiste, le rapport à la religion etc… Ces problèmes ont conduit à une désillusion certaine
envers l’économie du marché et envers la démocratie parlementaire. Partout les taux de participation aux
elections sont en chute constante, et le discredit des homes politiques est considerable.” (de Waele
2003:97).
vi
These are figures for 1988.
vii
This is not to downplay the extent of diversity between CEE states. Poland and Hungary embraced
reforms, whilst Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania were more resistant. In the words
of Elster, Offe and Preuss, these latter economies “were characterised by smaller private sectors, higher
degrees of monopolisation, less autonomous enterprises, and higher shares of CMEA trade than Hungary or
Poland” (TK, 44). In Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, some reforms did take place in the late 1980s.
viii
On the limits of Solidarity as a revolutionary movement, Gillingham states clearly: “The problems of
post-communist Poland began with Solidarity itself. It freed Europe from communism but could not
liberate Poland from its history of internal weakness. Now in disarray, Solidarity was a heterogeneous
grass-roots movement, at once democratic-socialist and Christian-conservative, bound together by idealism
but without the experience and know-how required either to reform the economy or govern a modern
nation. Universally admired by the conservative and liberal/libertarian right in the West, Solidarity – once
installed in office after heroic and painful compromises with the martial law communist dictatorship of
General Jarzelski during the 1980s – followed a socio-economic agenda as radical as any on the post World
War Two western European left” (Gillingham, 2003:432).
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