38
something at home to impose the military an externally-oriented mission.
20
Increased
peacekeeping participation will not necessarily lead to more civilian control; although higher
levels of civilian control might be translated into increased UN troop commitments. For example,
Pakistan has been historically a major UN troop contributor, but it is hardly a democratic country
with civilian control. Conversely, Argentina’s peacekeeping contributions have substantially
increased since the military was put under civilian rule in a post-authoritarian era. (Sotomayor
2004)
Therefore, peacekeeping is the dependent variable in terms of civil-military relations and
civilian control. .
With regards to the two cases being analyzed in this paper, Brazil’s and Mexico’s
peacekeeping contributions differ substantially because of variations in terms of civilian control.
Whereas Brazil has been able to exercise more control over the military in the past years, Mexico
has witnessed an erosion of civil-military relations since the transition to democracy took place in
2000. Brazilian civilian leaders are capable of imposing and designating external missions to the
armed forces. The Mexican civilians, by contrast, have been unable to erode military
prerogatives and spheres of influence. This in turn limits the ability of Mexican diplomats to
make larger security commitments with the United Nations in the form of peacekeeping
operations.
David R. Mares has developed a typology of civil-military relations according to cultural,
social and political determinants. The first two types (civilian-dominant and military-dominant)
include relations in which one side controls the other and has the capability to identify and
appropriate response to national threats. In the third type of relationship, pact among equals,
20
Other authors have argued the opposite relationship. In particular, Michael Desch believes that civilian
control can be improved by imposing external missions to the armed forces. However, he does not explain
how civilians can impose such missions when the military has institutional autonomy. If civilians can
undermine such autonomy and impose external missions to a traditionally insubordinate military, then
some degree of civilian control has been achieved. In turn, the external mission becomes the dependent
variable, making Desch’s argument rather tautological. Other authors who have treated peacekeeping
participation as an independent variable include Deborah Norden and Antonio Palá. See Desch 1999,
Norden 1995 and Palá 1998.
Convention