over the South Atlantic was seen as the second domino in the sequence. In the words of
General Guglialmelli the award that conceded Chile sovereignty over the islands,
clears the way for another Chilean claim: its right to a 200 mile territorial zone, a
new phenomenon derived from the modern law of the sea, a claim linked in turn to
a traditional geopolitical aspiration: to achieve a bioceanic projection, that is, to
establish a presence in the South Atlantic, in detriment of Argentina’s rights and
interests
232
.
In turn, as an Atlantic nation, Chile would be in a privileged position to pursue further
geopolitical aims: control over the South Atlantic islands (i.e., “insular Argentina”), on the
one hand
233
, and an expansion of its territorial claims on Antarctic soil (at the expense of
“Antarctic Argentina”), on the other
234
. At this stage, mainland Argentina would have
come within reach of Chilean expansion, proceeding through the geopolitically
underdeveloped Patagonian region
235
.
232
Guglialmelli 1978, p. 7.
Perhaps
a
testimony
of
the
pervasiveness
of
the
geopolitical
interpretive
framework
prevailing in the region was the fact that even some foreign academic analysts shared this
assessment of the issues at stake in the Beagle Channel dispute. I.e., “Chile desires to confirm its
status as an ‘Atlantic’ power, with access free of Argentine maritime control. Such status would be
conferred by extending a two-hundred-mile territorial or resource zone eastward from the Chilean-
possessed southernmost tip of the continent, using the three islands as a starting point”.
Selcher 1990, p. 106.
233
“The Argentine geopolitical parallel to Brazil’s theme of filling the Amazonic heartland is the
deeply felt desire to recover the islands of the South Atlantic (Malvinas/Falklands, South Georgia,
South Sandwich, and South Orkneys) and consolidate its sovereignty in the region. Two related
themes are to keep both Chile and Brazil out of the ‘Argentine’ South Atlantic as well as to make
good Argentina’s Antarctic claim”.
Jack Child 1990, pp. 62-63.
234
“Contending claims to Antarctica are drawn on the alternative bases of Chilean or
Argentinean possession of the islands and extend along lines of longitude southward from the
accompanying two-hundred-mile maritime jurisdiction zones in each case. In effect, Chilean
occupation of the islands cut the Argentine claim to Antarctic land by about two-thirds and vice-
versa, because of the presence of the Antarctic Peninsula in the disputed zone”.
Selcher 1990, p. 106.
235
“In a larger sense this Argentine geopolitical thrust southward is a continuation of the nineteenth
century drive to bring first the Pampas and then Patagonia under effective control of Buenos Aires”.
Jack Child 1990, p. 63.
“Many Argentineans firmly believe that Chile is already engaged in a ‘silent invasion’ of semi-
empty Patagonia through migration”.
Child 1986, p. 78.
Convention