Health and Post-Conflict Stability: Sierra Leone
9
development, and compensation for incapacitated war victims as well as post-
war rehabilitation and reconstruction.
22
Given that the value of diamonds alone extracted in Sierra Leone was estimated at
$300-$450 million per annum in the mid-1990s (albeit with only a tenth of this
amount actually passing through the official channels)
23
the CMRRD represented a
potentially valuable source of domestic revenue for reconstruction in the health sector
and other areas. However, the utility of the CMRRD was seriously undermined by the
decision to appoint the RUF leader Foday Sankoh as head of the Commission. This
came about partly as a power-sharing compromise seen as necessary during the
negotiation process and partly as a means of engaging Sankoh in the legitimate
political process. It was hoped that this inclusion would “change his views toward
serving the public interest – reconstructing Sierra Leone rather than looting it.”
24
Perhaps unsurprisingly this tactic failed, and Sankoh continued to fund the RUF from
mining proceeds.
25
The third health-related element of the Lomé Agreement, Part Five of the text
which specifically dealt with health and humanitarian issues, provided for the
unhindered involvement of international agencies in the provision of humanitarian
relief. In terms of action by the Sierra Leonean government, there was agreement on
the creation of a ‘National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation, and
Reconstruction’ (later renamed the National Commission for Social Action) to co-
ordinate humanitarian operations, and a commitment that “[t]he government
shall…endeavor to provide affordable primary healthcare throughout the country.”
However in practice the promise of Lomé was not immediately delivered.
Fighting restarted soon after the signing of the Agreement, and it was two years
before a lasting ceasefire was actually brought about after further agreements were
signed at Abuja in November 2000 and May 2001.
26
But although the Lomé
Agreement did not bring an end to the violence it at least marked the beginning of the
end, represented an important turning point in the course of the war, and provided the
22
Article VII
23
John L. Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, p.25.
24
William Reno, ‘Sierra Leone: Warfare in a Post-State Society’, p.93.
25
Dennis Bright, ‘Implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement’ in Paying the Price: The Sierra Leone
Peace Process, Special Issue of Accord (Conciliation Resources, September 2000). Available at
http://www.c-r.org/accord/s-leone/accord9/implement.shtml
.
26
The Abuja agreements effectively brought in new ceasefires and planned for the recommencement of
disarmament arrangements whilst recommitting the parties to the earlier Lomé Agreement “as the
framework for the restoration of genuine and lasting peace to the country.”
Convention