(Page 9 of 18) - THE EU STRATEGIC CULTURE: A SMALL STATE APPROACH authored by Toje, Asle.

Preliminary draft. Please do not cite without written permission from the author. Comments are welcome

for independent strategy. After the Cold War much of the transatlantic tensions have been tied
to the ongoing re-negotiation of the power-burden sharing equation where each party would
like to maintain the one and increase the other.

History makes Europeans generally reluctant to use force unless as a tool of last resort.

This

has shaped the EU strategic vocabulary where traditional terminology is exchanged for less
belligerent language. The EU does not invade, it intervenes. The first EU consensus on the
use of force arose from this situation. The CSDP was formed specifically to deal with
humanitarian crisis management in Europe captured in the “Petersberg tasks”, which
comprise humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat-force tasks in crisis
management, including peace making.

2) Geography

Without embracing structural determinism we must accept that a number of “constant
variables” are in place shaping the EU strategic culture, one such factor is geography. A
distinguishing characteristic of Europe is that there is no agreement about where it ends. The
natural barriers of the EU and associate members are made up by the Atlantic Ocean and the
Mediterranean Sea in the west, north and south while no such barriers exist in the east. In
strategic terms the EU has an exposed eastern flank. Europe has more kilometres of high
quality road than any other continent complimented by highly developed railway and aviation
systems. There is therefore little need to deploy combat-ready formations on the borders.
This need is lessened further by all exposed borders being under the protection of nuclear
deterrence provided by a great power, the United States. The territorial integrity of most of the
member states is underpinned by collective defence in accordance with the UN charter,
Article 5 of the West European Union, and the mutual solidarity clause in the European
Constitutional Treaty but most importantly NATO’s Article 5. These guaranteed coupled with
an absence of clear territorial threats translates into an overall feeling of security that is bound
to have impact on the EU strategic culture.

This creates a curious situation where the EU is assembling a security framework parallel to
that constructed by the US during the Cold War while continuing to rely on the US for
territorial defence. The deterrence embodied in US commitment to the territorial integrity of
its European allies allows the EU to develop a non-territorial strategic culture, probably the
first of its kind. However, the EU is not completely free from territoriality. The EU has
fashioned itself as pan-European Union where every European state is welcome, provided
they meet certain criteria. Since there is no agreement on where Europe ends it is possible to
claim that areas outside the western security frameworks, such as Moldova, Belarus, the
Ukraine and Georgia are European and this can in turn be used to trigger EU policies. Indeed
in 2004 the clearest attempts from the EU to act strategically were in relation to “near abroad”
cases such as Georgia, the Ukraine.

After centuries of exploitation Europe is a continent of limited natural resources but with vast
reserves of manpower. The external supply of natural resources is left to the mechanics of the
global market and control over necessities such as oil has remained subordinate in EU
strategy. European states have traditionally relied on conscription armies. This is reflected in
European operations being personnel intensive and a preference for ground operations.
Europeans have traditionally been outward looking, more ready to populate and rule foreign
lands than to isolate themselves. This has in turn helped build an appreciation for other culture