18
based (Magni 2005), they do lack the permanent presence that was recommended
above.
11
As opposed to CAP and CIDG, however, there is top-level support and, indeed,
acclamation for the PRTs. This support is internationally-based. As noted above, five of
the nineteen PRTs in place at the end of 2004 are led by ISAF members. This
multinational nature can create its own difficulties with concerns of coordination among
the various national commands.
Lesson 5: Native forces can be very successful, but within limits and only if given
sufficient support.
By training local forces, and giving them the impetus to defend their villages and
cities from the rebels, security can be undertaken by local forces rather than American
forces. This was the strength of the CIDG program in Vietnam during its early months.
The Special Forces soldiers would train local villagers and provide them with supplies
and support (for example, each strike team would have a radio to contact American
forces if they needed reinforcement). The strike teams, located as they were in their own
villages, were highly motivated to protect these areas.
However, the success was short-lived. In Vietnam, as MACV expanded the
CIDG program while at the same time diverting Special Forces to other operations,
it became necessary to turn the CIDG villages over to Vietnamese Special Forces.
Unfortunately, the incompetent manner in which the transfer was executed
effectively destroyed the pacification gains made under the aegis of the CIA. The
Vietnamese Special Forces were ill-equipped to assume the responsibilities of
11
There has also been an expansion of SOF activity throughout Afghanistan. The SOF have set up bases
around the country, either in or near villages too small to house PRTs. Like the PRT—or the CIDGs in
Vietnam—the SOF interact with the community’s elders, grant financial and material aid to those who
assist them, and provide security to the area (See Soloway 2002, Ware 2004, Mazzetti 2004).
Convention