2
counterinsurgency hold for CAP and CIDG. Other lessons, including ones related to the
training of local forces and manpower needs, are more easily debated.
Why Vietnam and why CAP and CIDG?
Of all the United States counterinsurgency, and indeed nationbuilding,
enterprises, why is Vietnam an apt case from which to take lessons? Indeed, authors
have argued for a variety of reasons that Vietnam is unique both in terms of insurgencies
and in US interventions in particular.
2
Moreover, there are unquestionable differences
between Vietnam and Afghanistan. While the war in Vietnam was largely a war over
ideology, the underlying differences among groups in Afghanistan are a mix of cultural,
religious, and economic issues. The multiple opposition forces—in the form of the
Taliban, al Qaeda, and followers of several warlords—unlike the singular opposition
group in South Vietnam, the Vietcong, do not have a single ideology they are trying to
put forward. Indeed, many of the groups may not have ideologies other than the
advancement of the group or leader. Many of these groups, including the Taliban, are
based around ethnic and clan ties. Additionally, rebel groups in Afghanistan may not
have even semi-permanent membership. Insurgents may come together for a strike or
series of strikes and then separate (Kukis 2004). In some ways, this makes the Afghan
(and the Iraqi) conflict much more difficult to win for the Americans. Defeat of one rebel
group does not end the insurgency. On the other hand, the Vietcong’s advantage was that
its ideology could be universally appealing, not limited to clan or ethnic group. The fact
that the organizations are not structured around political ideology, limits the potential
2
See, for example, Lomperis (1996)
Convention