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because so many of the states are also limited in their abilities to affect their own fates.
Beijing’s growing self-confidence simply seems to negate these possibilities, if not
preempt them in the eyes of the governments from Manila to Seoul.
Taiwan could perhaps increase its options if it were willing to alter some of its
positions where it differs fundamentally from the People’s Republic. To do so, however,
would be seen in the eyes of most Taiwan citizens as losing the battle before it is joined. If
Taiwan were willing to use the names Beijing finds acceptable, regardless how
cumbersome, then Taiwan would probably be able to participate in more organizations,
but not without Beijing’s victory as THE government of China.
Taiwan’s current government, as does much of the population, simply rejects the
realpolitik that Taiwan’s aspirations are simply not going to outweigh Beijing’s power to
influence other states’ recognition, the factor which conveys sovereignty to Taiwan.
Much of the discussion in Taiwan seems to operate in a vacuum, focusing exclusively on
Taiwan’s formal satisfaction of conditions for a sovereign nation-state.
Even in the
globalised, dramatically changed world of 2005, no state has the international power to
convey to itself legitimacy and, by extension, sovereignty.
This arguments coming from Taiwan show either an admirable, albeit irrelevant,
defiance or an insularity that shows how little the island’s leadership truly understands
about the world it seeks to participate with to a full degree.
Globalisation is not likely to change this because economic and political power
still overwhelmingly favor Beijing. Taiwan would probably be well off to accept its current
status without provoking Beijing to close doors that are still open.
It remains unclear
whether the Taipei government, with its highly active democracy, is capable or aspires to
do that.
Convention