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the efficacy of airpower, especially when armed with precision-guided munitions
(PGMs); the fact that space is a vital warfare theater; the importance of information
operations; the necessity of fielding special operations forces; and the importance of
doctrinal development and orthodoxy.
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China’s overwhelming military superiority against Taiwan in terms of numbers is
not surprising. What is unexpected, however, given Beijing’s unremitting hostility
toward Taipei and consistent threats to employ military force against unwelcome moves
by the Chen Shui-bian government, is the relatively lackadaisical attitude toward the
mainland threat by Taiwan governments during the past decade. Their defense policies,
characterized by declining defense budgets, have retarded the modernization and
improvement of the ROC armed services strongly supported by their uniformed
professionals.
In the event of armed conflict, Taiwan does not appear capable of a strong
defense against the PLA. Furthermore, if there is a conflict it will almost certainly be
decided by naval and aviation forces, well before Taiwan’s army has a chance to
intervene. And it is precisely in these two warfare arenas that the PLA is rapidly
increasing its superiority over Taiwan.
The U.S. Government listed seven forms of possible PLA operations against
Taiwan in its 2003 “Report on the Military Power of the PRC.”
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(1) provocative military exercises, including missile tests;
(2) provocative air activities, particularly flying across the unofficial but
hitherto mutually respected “center line” over the Taiwan Strait;
Convention