18
shift focus to France itself.
75
By early 1960 the insurgent elite had decided to regroup and
reorganize in Tunisia.
76
In short, the FLN was sensitive to indicators of resolve and
worked to raise the costs of the status-quo beyond the point the French were willing to
tolerate.
The deterrence approach explains the FLN’s refusal to make concessions in the
face of overwhelming French advantages in military power. While the FLN suffered
internal divisions it ultimately rejected the paix des braves and demanded that
negotiations on self-determination cover the evacuation of the “army of occupation.”
77
Even in negotiations at Evian the FLN stuck to a very hard line position and won on
almost all points.
78
A plausible explanation for the FLN’s decision not to abandon the
violent struggle or scale back its aims is its perception that the French were unwilling to
bear the costs to keep Algeria French.
Polarization
The August 1955 FLN attacks on pied noir men, women, and children at
Philippeville seems to have been driven by a desire to provoke a harsh government
response that would polarize the insurgent movement.
79
It can be argued that the FLN
decision to launch the Battle of Algiers was a direct response to the French government’s
June 1956 execution of important FLN figures.
80
Some FLN action, then, is consistent
with the polarization approach.
At the peak of the Challe offensive some in the French military predicted that the
75
Horne, 315, 318.
76
Horne, 328.
77
Connelly, 210, 227.
78
Talbott, 221-23.
79
Horne, 118-24.
80
Horne, 183-84.
Convention