28
British people, arguably the less effective a weapon it had become.”
139
Polarization
Some British action clearly polarized the insurgency. Perhaps the best example is
so-called Bloody Sunday, January 30, 1972, wherein British troops shot and killed
thirteen protesters.
140
As an IRA member later reflected “[e]vents that day probably led
more young nationalists to join the Provisionals than any other single action by the
British.”
141
Operation Motorman of July 1972 also served to increase recruits and harden
positions.
142
The hunger strikes of 1980-81 also had a polarizing effect on the republican
movement.
143
Some of the IRA’s rhetoric mirrored the polarization approach—the
struggle would continue without regard to British resolve. One member in the mid-80s
said that as long as the British “…hold guns to the throats of the Irish people, there will
always be an IRA to fight them.”
144
It should be recognized that the 1997 ceasefire and
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 were both preceded by a softening of
position in the form of a new Labour government in Britain.
145
VI. Analysis and Conclusions
Explaining the Variance: Algeria and Northern Ireland
In this section I address the overlap between the explanations laid out in the first
part of the paper and the two cases. The costly signals argument demonstrated some fit
139
English, 308. This argument also helps us make sense of the decision by some republicans to form a
break-away republican group the “Real IRA” that vowed to continue the violent struggle. English, 316.
140
Holland, 45-51.
141
English, 151.
142
English, 161.
143
English, 204.
144
English, 250. See also Moloney, 203.
145
English, 295.
Convention