2
costs for a particular good, the higher its resolve. I adopt a “situational” notion of resolve
rather than the “reputational” notion adopted by John Mercer.
3
Rather than argue that
states have a general reputation for high or low resolve I argue that insurgent groups view
target state resolve in the context of the specific dispute of interest to them at a specific
point in time. Insurgents in Iraq, for example, will be interested in American resolve with
regard to Iraq today rather than engaging in an assessment of general American
reputation for higher or lower resolve. Resolve entails two distinct elements when applied
to states and insurgent groups. First, target states may have varying willingness to incur
the costs of continued insurgent attacks rather than concede the disputed good (e.g.,
territory).
4
Second, target states may have varying willingness to incur the costs of the
counter-insurgency campaign. Counter-insurgency campaigns are often financially costly
but they may also carry costs in the form of social disruption and may have a negative
impact on the target state’s international reputation.
I use the term insurgent group to refer to non-state actors that use violent means to
achieve their objectives.
5
Terrorism, or violence directed primarily against
noncombatants in the hopes of generating long term psychological repercussions (e.g.,
fear), is one of the means insurgent groups may adopt.
6
This study views insurgent
groups as instrumentally rational in that they have political aims and take the most
3
Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 45-47.
4
At times an intermediate disputed good can be insurgent demands that the target government negotiate
with them.
5
For a similar definition of insurgency see Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern
Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles: Brassey’s, 1990), 13.
6
The definition I adopt here is based on that of O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 24-25. It also draws on
the discussions in Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 43 and
Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981) , 380.
Convention