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polarization approach seems to provide an explanation of the Northern Ireland outcome:
the more moderate Labour government, which came to power in 1997, led to a more
moderate position by the IRA. The problem with this approach is that it not consistent
with the much earlier general shift in the IRA away from violence and toward a political,
negotiated future (evidenced in the 1994 ceasefire and adoption of TUAS).
To sum up: the costly signals argument does not seem to provide a plausible
explanation of varying perceptions of resolve in these two cases whereas the action and
career interests explanations appear to fit the cases. While deterrence theory and the
polarization approach provide a plausible explanation of the outcome in Northern Ireland,
deterrence theory does better with the details and it provides a much more plausible
explanation of the outcome in the Algeria case. More extensive process-tracing research
would, of course, be necessary to determine if the causal impact of the factors that appear
to provide plausible explanations on the basis of this cursory study. In addition process-
tracing would help weigh the relative importance of the two explanations.
Resolve and Insurgency Today
A few initial lessons emerge from this study for target governments. First, target
governments must convince insurgents that they possess high resolve in order to convince
the insurgents to give up the armed struggle and to scale back some of their aims. Second,
target governments must realize that neither public statements nor tough military action
are likely to convince insurgents of high target resolve. Instead, the most important
element in signaling resolve is societal support for the target government’s
counterinsurgency policy. Third, insurgents are more likely to be receptive to signals of
high resolve if they are given a future career path in politics.
Convention