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weapons concealed in either commercial ships or aircraft, or perhaps the ability to stage an effective EMP
attack (either in region or over the U.S. using a nuclear-capable Scud fired from a converted freighter
while still at sea). Combined with its ability to launch either conventional or chemical/biological
munitions on major South Korean cities with its existing artillery or ballistic missile forces, North
Korea’s nuclear capability provides a strong additional deterrent against large-scale attacks on its central
interests.
A Hypothetical North Korean Retaliatory Strike on South Korea
How difficult would it be for Pyongyang to inflict immense casualties on South Korea with even
a limited nuclear arsenal? The answer is not difficult at all, and this capability serves to illustrate how
credible any kind of North Korean nuclear threat to retaliate would have to be taken by the South. Unlike
countries like Iran, which have long distances between themselves and the most attractive targets of
retribution for their nuclear forces, North Korea benefits from incredibly close geographic proximity to
many potentially high-value targets. This proximity becomes even more critical given that any hope of
interdiction (using either air or missile defenses) would be placed in a nearly impossible position of
defending not only a broad geographic area replete with potential targets, but also enjoying practically no
warning time whatsoever to respond to any attack. Even assuming only first-generation nuclear weapons
(15-20 kt), Table 9 below shows that within only 50 kilometers of the border (or roughly 30 miles), there
exist a large number of targets that a small arsenal of only 8-12 warheads (carried aboard short-range
ballistic missiles) could target. This small number of warheads is chosen as an example since it
represents the number of weapons U.S. intelligence has suggested North Korea might already possess. It
should be further noted that North Korea currently possesses four different fielded and tested short- to
medium-range ballistic missile systems easily capable to carrying out such strikes: the Scud-B (300
km/186 mile range); the Scud-C (500 km/310 mile range); the No Dong (1,300 km/806 mile range); and
the Taepo Dong (1,500-2,000 km/930-1,240 mile range).
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North Korean artillery could also conceivably
be used to attack this fifty kilometer deep area in South Korea, using nuclear shells (if developed) or more
likely, chemical or biological munitions. Indeed, it has been widely reported that North Korea is capable
of delivering over half a million artillery rounds per hour on the South Korean capital of Seoul (18.6km or
30 miles distant from the border). There can be little doubt that North Korea, even in its fairly early
stages of nuclear development, has a highly credible capability to deliver WMD on a range of South
Korean targets.
South Korea’s vulnerability to North Korean attack is a result of its rapid postwar development in
which nearly half of the country’s population ended up within a three-minute flight of the DMZ.”
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Thus,
even in the case of conventional war, the costs would be immense for South Korea (estimated at 1 million
dead), as former Defense Minister Lee Yang Ho noted:
“It is assumed that if the United States were to strike North Korea that the North Koreans would
fight back…All industry would be destroyed, gas stations, power plants. This is such a densely
populated area that even if North Korean artillery were not very accurate, anyplace you would hit
there would be huge numbers of casualties.”
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Of course, the recent redeployment of U.S. forces further South, away from the DMZ and Seoul,
removes 14,000 troops who could have easily been targeted by North Korean artillery – but this does not
prevent them from remaining targets of a North Korean nuclear riposte.
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Indeed, the redeployment
envisions creating “hub bases” south of Seoul that would be roughly 75 miles from the DMZ, a location
out of range of North Korean artillery, but certainly not beyond the reach of its ballistic missiles.
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(Table 9 – Potential Counter-Value Targets in South Korea Located Fifty Kilometers (30 miles) From
Border and Vulnerable to Retaliatory Nuclear Strike by North Korean (2005) Arsenal of 12
Warheads.)
Convention