19
beliefs, but rather unequivocally show “Japan’s stand and ambition to emerge [as] a new
nuclear force in the 21st century.”
57
Key to understanding all of these recent comments about Japan possibly
possessing nuclear weapons is that they have been made in an environment where there
has been a resurgence of Japanese nationalism and a noticeable movement toward
becoming a normal country.
58
Introducing the political seeds for changing the public
mindset about nuclear weapons can easily be construed as a normal thing to do for a
major industrial nation striving to become a normal country. Normal countries that
possess nuclear weapons legitimate the existence of their arsenals by stressing the
deterrent effect; they exist, therefore, for defensive purposes. Moreover, it has not been
an anomaly for a so-called normal country to threaten to use nuclear weapons, or at least
to keep this as an option, against a perceived enemy. Testifying to the importance
governments place on having the immediacy of a nuclear threat at their disposal are that
China is the only declared nuclear power that has a policy stating that it will not be the
first to use nuclear weapons and, more generally, negative security assurances have not
been codified into international law.
That amending the war-renouncing constitution has been an ongoing political
issue in Tokyo during the last several years shows definitely that the footprints of the
revisionists have begun to trespass on Japanese pacifism. No one would quarrel with
Ozawa’s statement that Japan could produce many nuclear weapons. The open question
is whether revisionist and nationalist forces are strong enough to sustain a discussion on
the need for Japan to develop a small “defense-only” nuclear arsenal as the nation
pursues a normal country status. Advancing the argument that possessing such a nuclear
Convention