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In terms of the variables we categorize as defining the nature of the conflict, both the
indicators reflecting the duration and intensity of the war have a demonstrable effect on the
settlement’s content. A standard deviation increase in the length of the war increases the
expected count in the number of power sharing provisions specified in an agreement by
approximately 182 percent. This confirms Zartman’s expectation that it is primarily those wars
that have dragged on for extended periods of time that encourage combatants to contemplate the
possibility of compromise with their enemies.
Although only statistically significant at the .1 level, conflict intensity also appears to
have a degree of influence on the number of power-sharing and power-dividing institutions
specified in an agreement. This finding, however, is contrary to our initial expectations. Recall
that we had hypothesized that wars defined by higher numbers of monthly casualties should
increase the willingness of combatants to compromise through the creation of power-sharing and
power-dividing institutions in order to quickly stop the killing. The results indicate, however,
that it is actually when wars yield substantial monthly casualties that settlement architects prove
less inclined to design provisions for sharing or dividing state power. A standard deviation
increase in the number of war dead reduces the expected number of power-sharing or power-
dividing institutions present in an agreement by approximately 27 percent. What accounts for
this relationship? We interpret it as an indication that a higher monthly casualty rate establishes
a sense of mutual grievance and suspicion among combatants that makes any efforts at
compromise challenging. Having lost friends and relatives to the war, individuals are
understandably wary of the idea of compromise and interaction with those they know to be
responsible for the killing.
Convention