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Castro, for example, reiterated his commitment for land reform, which helped assure
his base among the plantation laborers and poorer hill farmers, upon whom he and his
guerrillas were dependent for food and shelter and to whom they looked for fresh recruits
(Prosterman & Riedinger 1987, p.22). And this, I will discuss in the next chapter.
Land Reform
Land reform is a measure for make the rural society less unequal, through the
redistribution of land, giving property rights and ownership for poor peasants. The theory of
collective action (Olson 1971) poses an obstacle in explaining why a rebellion occurs in the
first place. If free riders could all jump on the public goods offered after the final victory of
the rebels toward the government, why should they participate? But, who are the rebels, since
all rebels in potential want to be free riders and not risk their lives in a bloody fight? If you
can use public goods (ex.: street lights) and not pay for them, why should you? Who pays the
bill? In this sense, civil wars or collective political violence in general would not exist at all.
At most extreme cases, it would be repression from the government in alliance with landlords
(in our case, where lower classes peasants are the potential recruited rebel forces) but with no
relevant reaction (the masses are afraid of incumbent subsequent repression and do not want
to risk their lives). Also coercion by the government (for army soldiers) or by rebel
organizations (as drafted rebels) would solve this puzzle. They would
“join” the group
because they are forced to, but they wouldn
’t be good/high motivated soldiers/rebels.
Another answer is simple: selective incentives should be offered to peasants as they
could be recruited. Which kind of rewards do peasants want/need? L-A-N-D. Small holders
want a bigger portion of land which they can not only subsist, but profit, if possible. They
also want protection from large landlord eviction threats they often suffer of. Landless people
(tenants and wage laborers) want land as well, where they don
’t need to pay rent and can
extract from it all their needs for being healthy and providing food for their families. Other
related land issues as rural credit, agriculture expertise, and so on, will be part of the next
incumbent responsibilities as they win the war and start to govern. Since land is scarce and
most of it is owned before the violence erupts, it will be taken from two sources: large
landowners and state, the only blameable entities for the terrible situation.
Land as selective incentive does not come alone. Lichbach argues that the selective
incentive should come together with ideology.
“Peasants’ interests in material incentives is a
function of his/her income. Richer peasants can better afford to be motivated by non-
materialistic considerations
” (Lichbach 1994, p.400), but peasants, after all, decide to
participate or not in actions depending on the selective incentives. Many times the selective
incentives are lacking, and they are promised for the future, as positions in the post-
revolutionary regime. The state also offers incentives to the army, and to dissidents of the
rebels. As many sides can pay selective incentives, the peasant will see who offers better
payments. But, as the incumbent have more possibilities of reward, the dissidents will also
use ideologies for make the difference.
Weinstein found that in rebel organizations that are relatively rich in resources, which
they can revert to the rebels themselves and actually paying them in kind or cash, the fighters
are low motivated and low committed with the organization and in every moment they can
quit. In contrast, rebel organizations which are scarce in resources cannot afford to pay the
fighters for their
“job”, therefore they make future promises (Weinstein 2003). Those rebels
are highly motivated, better fighters than the first group. They stay in the organization until
the end, mainly because they want to receive their prizes (which is land). The promises
concern the period after the war is won and the insurgents take the power and redistribute the
sources. As I said at the end of the last chapter, Castro
’s future promise of land reform after
Convention